Wanted–More Spending *The Editors*

THE NEW REPUBLIC

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NATO Divided

Alastair Buchan

"Cooking" the Cuban News

Stanislav Koutnik

The Rule of Law

Quincy Wright

Black on White

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

The Magic Eye of Television

★ President Kennedy comes as shyly to a piece of public sentiment as a bashful swain to his blushing Aminta. At the end of his spectacular hour's TV broadcast this week (which all Washington is talking about) all he said was, "I think we ought to be rather pleased with ourselves this Christmas."

How long has understatement been a part of American public life! We couldn't help thinking how much better it would have been handled if things had gone a little differently in 1960.

(Lights; Camera: You-know-who sitting in the White House, with Trisha and Julie doing homework and Checkers before the fire. Soft music.)

"Folks, I want to conclude this hour's visit with you in our modest little home with this solemn thought: we should be proud of our country, of our sturdy boys and girls." (*Jingle Bells.*)

"I know that we shall win over atheistic, Communist materialism." (Fade to Cathedral interior; organ – *I'm Dreaming of a White Christmas.*)

"This is a typical American home, friends and neighbors, where you have done me the wonderful honor of visiting. Although it is modest, remember that it was good enough for Abraham Lincoln and Dwight D. Eisenhower, so Pat and I don't complain about the plumbing." (Chuckle.)

"Pat's sitting over there now, unaware that you are peeping at her through the magic eye of television (pause) and I want to say here that the best thing that ever happened to me (pause) was when I married her . . . sitting over there." (*Silent Night, Holy Night.*)

"So let us extend the moral and spiritual values to the world as exemplified in this little room. In short (pause) I think we ought to be rather pleased with ourselves this Christmas." (Scene dissolves to White House exterior, growing smaller below as viewed from sky: Stars, Snow, Santa's sled.)

That's the way a real pro would have handled the chance!

No doubt about it, Mr. Kennedy has grown in two years; there is also a new feeling of confidence and power.

This broadcast came over because he was relaxed and because, with remarkable candor and detachment, he was describing extraordinary problems in a tone of reasonableness, moderation and coolness. The scene was unforgettable: the young man sitting there in his old-fashioned rocker, (wedged at the bottom so as not to rock out of camera sight) hitching from side to side so that a knob from the back appeared first on one side of his head, then the other; the chair covered with antimacassars, and the room itself looking like a cluttered Victorian drawing room – and discussing nuclear overkill and 150 million possible casualties.

TV versus The Press

★ Let's face it, we have a remarkable President, one with a Quiz Kid's knowledge of illiteracy in Chile, and average annual wages in Somaliland; one who talks with clarity at 400 words a minute and one with a historical knowledge of what the Presidency is. Also he has the confidence and presence to field unrehearsed questions from 300 newsmen at a press conference, 2,000 skeptical businessmen on taxes in New York, three television interrogators and an audience of 20 million, all in a week. His only fluff was to say "Hell" in public and he saw the phrase coming and managed to change it to a kind of swallowed "heh" sound. In the mimeographed transcript, however, there it was, on the steel crisis – "there is no sense in raising hell, and then not being successful."

There is some concern among newsmen that the new TV vehicle may replace the customary press conference. We guess it won't, though it is a medium tailored for Mr. Kennedy's advantage and seems likely to be valuable for big occasions. But the needling press conference is important, too; sharper, more brutal questions can be hurled from the prow of a press conference at a Presidential Moby Dick, and though some of them may be minor and regional they have an invaluable quality of telling a President what the country is talking about.

President Kennedy boldly declared that if he loses the upcoming Rules Committee fight "we can't function," and "we are through." The same day formidable Rules Committee chairman, leathery old Judge Smith of Virginia, challenged him, declaring that the issue was "non-negotiable." The committee, of course, channels legislation through the House, where it has a veto power. To give the Administration more control, the committee's membership was raised last session from 12 to 15, by a close vote, 217-212.

Now the battle comes again, with no Speaker Rayburn to aid the President and four of the 22 Republicans who previously backed him no longer in the House. We have a hunch, however, that Mr. Kennedy will win. Why? Well, for one thing, because the three men added to the committee – Rep. Avery (R, Kan.), Elliott (D, Ala.), and Sisk (D, Cal.) – all want to stay. The House operates on intensely personal lines. These three men command sympathy and will claw and kick to retain their honor, and their state delegations will tend to aid them.

"We've Become New Conservatives"

★ Not for long have we read such a savage denunciation of American conformity as Mr. Justice Douglas' *Freedom of the Mind* (paperback, 44pp, 60 cents, Public Affairs Pamphlets, 22 E. 38th St., NYC). "Conformity," he says, "appears to be the only safe course"; in foreign affairs it is often the Pentagon, not the State Department, that sets the policy abroad, the CIA's intercession "in foreign elections with its moneybags is never reported." The CIA "has been more responsible than any other agency for foreign policy in the Middle East."

We have a "predilection to provincialism," a "conservative class that controls the mass media of communication," a polarization "right of center"; in short, says the irate judge, "We have become the new conservatives who, unlike the old, practice intolerance." We should like to see this pamphlet go out to colleges in bales.

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Wanted–More Spending

The case for tax cuts in 1963 which the President put to the Economic Club of New York on December 14 was persuasive, though flawed by premature concessions to the budget-balancers. Noting that the economy has been limping along for some time, the President said that economic policy should be judged against what it *could* do, not against what it did last year or the year before. In other words, we should not give undue weight to those frequent announcements of "new highs" in incomes and employment; "new highs" can be reached even when the gap between actual and potential output is widening, as it has been. The President emphasized that the balance of payments should not be permitted to dominate domestic economic policy. He further noted that the present tax system is unduly complicated and has special provisions which create inequities and distort the allocation of our resources. He effectively by-passed the traditional liberal-conservative squabble by proposing that tax cuts be applied to both low and high income brackets, though he should, perhaps, have emphasized the stimulating effect of reducing taxes on lower personal incomes.

Whatever name one gives the mediocre performances of the economy, the fact is that we have been traveling at very much less than full speed. As of December 12, the seasonally adjusted figure for unemployment was 4.2 million, about 200,000 more than in October. The annual growth rate during the past two years has averaged 3.5 percent, which, though higher than in the previous two years, is not enough to get the jobless back to work or put American capacity to full use. It is also substantially below the 4.4 percent growth rate to which the US has formally committed itself within the OECD. It is estimated that our national income for this calendar year will be around $553 billion. Yet, we have the plant, the equipment and the labor force to produce a Gross National Product of at least $600 billion. The reason why we have been moving sideward rather than upward is the persistent weakness of demand – too little aggregate spending by businesses, households and the government. Once this is understood (and the Byrd-wing in Congress seems incapable of understanding it), one immediately appreciates the fallacy of tying tax cuts to cuts in federal spending. For this simply depresses demand further, decreases economic activity and employment, and reduces the tax base and thus tax revenues.

Chairman Wilbur Mills, the reluctant dragon of House Ways and

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Means, has been blowing hot and cold on this question of federal expenditures. It nevertheless appears that he would be willing to tolerate some sort of tax cut if it were accompanied by tax reform. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any equitable reforms would lead to appreciable increases in private spending; and *spending* – by consumers, business, government – is the remedy for our current problems. Reform is certainly desirable, both to reduce inequities among taxpayers and to encourage business investment. But reform will not affect unemployment of plant or manpower in 1963 or 1964, and it has no real connection with a tax cut.

The prickly question to which a White House answer has yet to be given is how big a cut is needed. The US Chamber of Commerce favors $8.6 billion; the Committee for Economic Development favors an immediate cut of $6 billion and a second $5 billion cut if government expenditures can be curbed. If the President wants high-level employment and a $600 billion economy, then, in our judgment, a tax cut in 1963 of at least $10 billion is in order – and the large share of it should benefit low income taxpayers. If that decision is made, however, the federal deficit might run to $10 billion for fiscal '63. For fiscal '64 (beginning July 1, 1963) the deficit might be $15 billion – $2.5 billion more than the record peacetime deficit of President Eisenhower in 1959. Given the present slack in the economy, such a deficit would not lead to inflation, and its impact on the US balance-of-payments deficit would be manageable. It would not worry most economists, though it would scare many politicians.

If the President asks for a reduction of $7 billion or less, it will be because, for political and not economic reasons, he chooses to keep the fiscal 1964 deficit below that of 1959, rather than to increase domestic income and drastically cut unemployment. Yet whatever his decision, there will be political repercussions. If the budget deficit is small in the next several years, the Republicans in 1964 may charge that Mr. Kennedy has failed to get the economy moving again; if he gets the economy moving again, his opponents may blame him for the nation's largest peace-time deficit. Both politically and economically, however, the second charge is more bearable than the first. The most telling reply this Administration can deliver to its critics is the example of a fully employed and forward-moving economy.

Growth for What?

The President left a great many things unsaid in his tax speech to the Economic Club in New York which he may say later. He did not make clear that temporary deficits are not bound to produce government surpluses, even in the long run. This may or may not happen, depending on how vigorously the private economy responds to the stimulus of a tax cut.

Furthermore, what really matters today is not whether there are federal deficits, but *how* they are incurred; whether they are "passive" or "active"; whether they are the result, as they have been lately, of an unsatisfactory level of spending for growth, or whether they are the result of an aggressive effort to stimulate the economy.

Likewise, the speech left some doubt whether the Congress should link tax cuts to tax reform. Though both are desirable, tying them together is likely to delay the enactment of a tax cut, since Congress cannot be expected to pass a major tax reform bill in a single session. On the other hand, if Congress does by some chance rush through a combined cut-reform bill, the reforms are likely to be minimal and will serve largely as window dressing to justify substantial reductions in top-bracket tax rates.

Finally, by far the most important omission in Mr. Kennedy's New York speech was the absence of any reference to urgent public needs other than defense and the exploring of space. No one questions that all "unnecessary government expenditures" should be eliminated, or that government agencies and departments should be encouraged to be efficient. But these truisms do not justify holding non-defense spending "at approximately its current level," as the President pledged. Increases in federal expenditures are desirable whether or not there is a tax cut. In its present state, with so much under-employment of plant and people, America can afford – indeed would profit from – both tax cuts *and* increased federal spending. Moreover, "growth" is not the only national objective; it may not even be the paramount objective. As Simon Kuznets pointed out in *The New Republic* recently, "It is scarcely helpful to urge that the over-all growth rate be raised to X percent a year without specifying the components of the product that should grow at increased rates. . . ." Since 1954, the federal government's non-military expenditures have increased by $20 billion, but only $4 billion of this has gone for education and community improvement.

On other occasions the President has spoken of the responsibility of the government to help raise the "standard of living." That is a qualitative as well as a quantitative goal. There are things – and there are things worth having. Among those things worth having which are in short supply are parks, playgrounds, clean air, unpolluted water, more harmonious and less frantic urban development, convenient transportation, better education and greater security against the ravages of disease. Knowing that his business audience in New York is suspicious of government spending and that their spokesmen in the 88th Congress will be powerful,

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Mr. Kennedy may have felt that such public needs were better discussed another day. One cannot quarrel with this kind of tactical retreat so long as it does not signify surrender to the Byrds who will never be in this Administration's hand.

Upheaval in Central Africa

Separatist parties have now won elections in all three of the British colonies which form the Central African Federation. The disintegration of the Federation has therefore become merely a matter of time. The British Government last week formally recognized Nyasaland's right to secede and move toward independence. In Northern Rhodesia the African parties won 80 percent of the vote in the recent elections, and have put aside their differences to form an African government. Their intention, which London is unlikely to oppose, is to follow Nyasaland into independence. Even in white-dominated Southern Rhodesia, which profited from association with the copper-rich North and has always been the great supporter of Federation, electoral victory went last week to the Rhodesian Front. This white-supremacist party opposes continued association with the governments (now black) of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

While the Rhodesian Front's victory will make dissolution of the Federation easy, it will enormously increase Britain's difficulties in dealing with Southern Rhodesia itself. Mr. R. A. Butler, the British Minister in charge of Central Africa, can no longer argue to the United Nations or the British Parliament that the local European leadership is moving reasonably fast toward an African majority government. Now that the almost exclusively white electorate has replaced Sir Edgar Whitehead by Winston Field, a tobacco grower whose policy has been called (though not with Field's approval) "polite apartheid," gradualism seems dead. Whitehead pledged to repeal the Land Apportionment Act and remove all racial discrimination, which would have meant that Africans could have built their homes next to Europeans, and could have sent their children to the same schools. This alarmed the whites, but without attracting African voters, who want a promise of political power, not modest social reforms. Of 3.6 million Africans, 60,000 were eligible to vote. Of these, 50,000 refused to register earlier in the year, and 7,000 of those registered boycotted the election.

The Conservative Government in Britain has drastically reduced both its military and juridical power to intervene in Southern Rhodesia. If Whitehead had won the elections many observers believe that Butler would have offered Southern Rhodesia total independence at the same time as Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, arguing that it had shown its will and ability to move peacefully toward African majority rule. To give independence to Winston Field would deprive the ten-to-one African majority of all prospect of political advance, and invite violence.

British business and financial interests in Southern Rhodesia rightly feel that Field's victory increases the chance they will ultimately lose their investments through civil upheaval, and fear that independence would eliminate what stability remains. Their influence on the Conservative Party is considerable. Nevertheless, siren voices (including that of the London *Times*) are hinting that independence is the easiest way for Butler to disengage from an embarrassing responsibility. This is a tempting prospect at a moment when Macmillan's collapsing prestige seems to be putting leadership of the Conservatitve Party within Butler's reach. As in South Africa, the chance of avoiding bloodshed seems to be waning.

Deadend in Hong Kong

The flow of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong continues at the somewhat stifled pace of 50 a day legally, and close to 600 a day illegally. This gives Hong Kong the highest rate of population increase in the world – an annual increment of nine percent (six percent from refugees, three percent from natural fecundity).

Hong Kong has made do manfully, providing the food, shelter, and space – through land reclamation projects – for the Chinese refugees who make up the bulk of its population. Various international welfare agencies have been of great assistance. Living standards have been on the upswing; unemployment is slight. The Colony voluntarily has restricted exports of its major industry – textiles – to Great Britain to permit domestic producers a chance to rebound; it has gone along with US import restrictions on Hong Kong textiles, forebearing to point out that these restrictions were not wholly consistent with popular clamor in the US that the Colony should not turn back any refugees to China. Now it faces the grim possibility that British negotiators will be unable to procure any markets for Hong Kong in the Common Market. This would mean a 20 percent loss in exports. With the textile industry headed downhill, the labor market in the Colony is about to be engulfed with young, unskilled workers. Over 40 percent of the population is 15 years of age or younger.

Nor are Hong Kong's problems likely to be solved by emigration. Some will continue to head for Formosa, to serve in Chiang Kai-shek's army. A few will go to Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Many would like to come to America, but even after last spring's emergency change in regulations, the US will issue fewer than

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5,000 visas to Chinese in 1962. This is progress compared to 1961, when we admitted only 136 Chinese, but it still takes care of only one week's influx into Hong Kong. Only a radical change in regulations – elimination, for example, of the sponsorship requirement, subsidies to cut ship fares for migrants, or establishment of schools which would prepare applicants to meet the literacy test – would allow a substantial increase in emigration to the US. None of these reforms is likely.

Either Hong Kong finds new industry quickly or it will cease to be the relatively shining Western example it now is on China's doorstep. Ironically, the Colony's decline bodes ill for the Chinese as well, for Peking now derives its second largest supply of foreign exchange from the sale of foodstuffs to Hong Kong. It uses the money to buy cheap, high calorie-content foods elsewhere in Asia.

Signals From Venus

With the characteristic caution of a scientist, NASA Director James E. Webb has called the flight of Mariner II to Venus "perhaps the most spectacular" of the nation's scientific achievements. It is more than that; it is probably the most spectacular scientific experiment ever performed by man. The 447-pound vehicle carried about 50 pounds of miniature instruments: two radiometers to measure the intensity of solar cosmic rays; a magnetometer to measure the strength of the interplanetary magnetic field, as well as that of Venus; a tiny microphone, to record the number of micrometeorites striking the vehicle; a microwave antenna and receiver, to measure the radiation emitted by the atmosphere and the surface of Venus; and an infrared camera to measure the temperature at the top of the dense layer of clouds that hides the surface of the planet.

The coded output pulses of these instruments, radioed back to earth across 36 million miles of space, are now being analyzed in the computers of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California. Earlier data from Mariner II has already revealed new information about interplanetary space. The instruments detected a solar wind – a thin cloud of gas – boiling off the surface of the sun and blowing outward across the solar system at a speed greater than 900,000 miles per hour. They also detected a relatively dense cloud of cosmic dust surrounding the earth.

When the latest and most important information from Mariner II is revealed, astronomers will know for the first time the approximate length of the Venusian day, the temperature of the planet and of its atmosphere, whether or not the atmosphere contains water vapor, and whether or not Venus has a magnetic field and hence a Van Allen belt. Centuries of optical observation and two decades of work with radio telescopes and radar have failed to yield satisfactory answers to any of these questions. Because clouds obscure all surface features of the planet, for example, optical methods cannot determine how often Venus turns on its axis. Radar, which penetrates clouds, led to two different results: observers in the USSR concluded that Venus rotates once every 9 to 11 days, but those in the US believe that it rotates approximately once every 225 days. If the Soviets are correct, Venus may have a relatively uniform climate; if US scientists are correct, then one side of the planet may always face the sun, causing enormous temperature differences between the hot and the cold side.

The results of the Venus observations will be released December 27. Contrary to speculation in the popular press, they will provide little if any information about the possibility of the existence of some form of life on Venus. But they will answer some of the oldest questions about the earth's "twin" planet and will mark the farthest penetration of human intelligence into the silent void of the cosmos.

WILLIAM E. BOGGS

COMING: *James Tobin on "Deficit, Deficit, Who's Got the Deficit?"*

No Star over Geneva

There have been no tidings of comfort and joy from Geneva; the three-power subcommittee which was attempting to negotiate a nuclear test ban agreement recessed, unreconciled, on December 18 for the holidays.

The Russians claim that underground tests can be detected *and* identified (the distinction is important) from outside the national boundaries of the superpowers. But they have declined to produce or demonstrate the equipment which they claim can do this job, or to approve an East-West conference of scientists to study the problem. The Russians also claim that seismic monitoring stations and on-site inspections within the USSR could be used for espionage. In a sense this is a fair complaint. The CIA could perhaps tap one or two of the neutral inspectors who had been into closed parts

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of Russia, and these inspectors might provide certain indirectly useful information. But given the kind of limited inspection now proposed, and the safeguards the US has offered to accept, the value of such information would be extremely marginal – far less, for example, than the value of data brought back by US exchange students (many of whom have been approached by CIA).

If the Russian position is indefensible, the American position is not unassailable either. For one thing, public statements about the difficulty of identifying underground nuclear explosions have been exaggerated. But, government officials explain, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy has been unwilling to accept the kind of minimal inspection which technical innovation now makes feasible. And if the Joint Committee says a thing isn't so, then for official purposes it matters little what scientists may say.

The US has, therefore, been reluctant to put its scientific claims to empirical test. It could, for example, publicly challenge the Soviets to identify all our underground tests (some of which have not been announced). If they failed, our case for more rigorous inspection would be greatly strengthened. If they succeeded, we would almost certainly have to back down and accept an internationally-monitored agreement.

This raises the final and most serious question, which is how much the US Government really wants a test ban. No treaty can prevent the Soviets from preparing to test in secret and then denouncing the agreement – perhaps on the pretext that French tests (which will continue no matter what the US and USSR decide) were really a cover for US ventures. Nor can the US keep thousands of scientists at work in laboratories preparing for a test series which will only be carried out if the Russians denounce the treaty. Under these circumstances, the USSR might conceivably achieve a major breakthrough, upsetting the balance of terror, which it would take the US many years to duplicate. Given this difficulty, many skeptics feel that it is unwise to get committed to a test ban unless there is convincing proof the Soviets are serious about sticking to the agreement. These skeptics have urged elaborate inspection not because it is needed to detect Soviet tests, but because they regard Soviet acceptance of the inspection principle as a litmus test of the Soviet's intention to abide by the treaty permanently.

Neither side wants a treaty enough to make any major sacrifices to get it. Neither side apparently regards fallout as a serious health hazard. Neither side expects a test ban to be a decisive step toward halting the arms race or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This being the case, perhaps it is time to turn attention to other less complicated arms control schemes.

Christopher Jencks

Satevepost

It is perhaps mere trifling at this late date to call attention to the impact of the Stevenson affair upon the art of journalism. What has jarred the craft is that writers regarded as master-craftsmen went out on a limb on the simple word of an unidentified public servant without, so far as is known, a shred of documentary evidence. A cub, of course, has always swallowed anything. But a change has come over the spirit of American Journalism when experienced reporters will publish grave charges on the verbal assurance of a politician. This is a far cry from Mark Sullivan's famous dictum that "the only way for a newspaperman to look at a politician is down."

Once upon a time it was thought that a reporter whose attitude toward journalism was, "It's a living," ought to get into a "public relations" outfit just as rapidly as possible. But it seems that we are not that corny any longer. It's smart to let one politician use your columns to crack the skull of another politician whom he doesn't like. It's modern to howl with laughter at that comic character, Joseph Story, for the idiocy in his woeful verse:

"Here shall the Press the People's right maintain
Unawed by influence and unbribed by gain."

So be it. History has long recognized that one generation's saints are the next generation's clowns, and grandpap's pride is the butt of grandson's jest; so perhaps a journeyman *emeritus* should not presume to set contemporary standards.

Nevertheless, the old boy will do it, come what may. His standards may be outmoded but he is too set in his ways to change them. To the end of his days he will find a sting in the line, "The clinking of the guinea helps the hurt that honor feels." He will continue to admire Benjamin Franklin, founder of the *Saturday Evening Post*, not because he cleaned up enough to retire at 42, but because he had the catchpolls on his heels in Boston and a price on his head in Philadelphia, for refusing to pimp for the politicians then in office. Ben was never a Sunday-school model, God knows, and he was obviously not fitted to be chief executive of the *Saturday Evening Post* today; but there was that in him which makes some ancient gaffers take pride in being members of his craft. And it wasn't the way he collared the coin.

"Times change," quoth Holingshed, "and we are changed with them." But not all, and not altogether. Some there are, possibly more than a few, so stiff-necked that they regard the denigration of the craft of journalism as more lamentable than anything that has happened to Stevenson or Kennedy, or even (but tell it not in Gath) to the Democratic Party.

Gerald W. Johnson

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THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS A SHAKY MAKE-SHIFT

Twilight of the Adenauer Era

Bonn

The West German Cabinet changes which accompanied the formation, on December 11, of Adenauer's fifth and last government were not in themselves surprising. The manner in which they were made was. The ex-Minister for all-German affairs, Ernst Lemmer, first heard of his dismissal – after six years of steady service – from a member of the press. The Minister for Atomic Affairs, Siegfried Balke, was told that he was no longer in the Cabinet by one of the doormen at his Ministry. A third among the seven discarded Ministers was heard to say that, "the hallmark of the thanks of Adenauer's Chancellery is the total absence of the most elementary rules of politeness." Two former Free Democratic Ministers were bade no farewell by the Chancellor; their own party Chairman, Erich Mende, acted as a messenger of ill tidings.

This epic lesson in bad manners will probably be one of the last authoritarian gestures of the Chancellor, following his announcement on December 7 of his final retirement next autumn. The curt dismissals stamp this last Adenauer government for what it is – a hasty scramble to bring in one or two younger men, pacify the Chancellor's Free Democratic allies and the Bavarian branch of his own party, and bridge the 10-month gap before the "Adenauer era" ends. Only five days before the new government was formed, Adenauer was still flirting with the Social Democrats and toying with the idea of prolonging his term of office well into 1964, or even up to the 1965 Federal Election. Only five days before the unsteady Christian Democratic-Free Democratic alliance was renewed in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and embarrassment, Adenauer was planning to drive the Free Democrats out of the Bundestag – to all intents, out of political life – by an electoral reform aimed at obliterating the smaller parties.

It goes without saying that the new government will be weak and unsure of itself. In theory, the new government's formation has ended the seven week crisis set off at the end of October by the *Spiegel* Affair. In practice, Bonn's shrill political kettle can blow its top again at any moment during the next weeks and months. Here are my reasons for saying so.

Adenauer has still, in spite of the proddings of members of his own party and the fervent appeals of virtually the whole independent press, refused to nominate his successor. This has robbed the announcement of his own retirement, "soon after" the Parliamentary holiday ends next September, of much of its potentially salutary effect. There will continue to be cabals, combinations and intrigues in the Christian Democratic Party just as long as the succession remains unsettled. There will continue to be an Erhard faction, a Krone faction, a Schroeder faction, a Gerstenmaier faction. There may now even be a von Hassell faction, since the 49-year-old Prime Minister of Land Schleswig-Holstein has been transplanted to Bonn to succeed the discarded Defense Minister, Franz-Josef Strauss. The members of the warring factions will know, moreover, that Adenauer has refused to nominate Erhard because he still hopes to prevent his becoming Chancellor.

The animosities stirred up between the Christian and Free Democrats will not disappear simply because the two parties have decided to embark on another three-legged race for the next ten months. The two "strong men" of the Free Democratic Party, Erich Mende and Wolfgang Doering, have ostentatiously stayed out of the government. Neither man will serve under Adenauer's Chancellorship. Here is a curious basis for the loyal cooperation between the two parties, which can alone make the coalition work. But apart from this, the *Spiegel* Affair will drag on for many more weary months, and some even predict that the case against the "treasonable" editors of the weekly paper will finally collapse.

Whatever the feelings on the Ministerial benches, the situation on the floor of the Bundestag will not be much better. For a most unpredictable factor will emerge there, in the shape of ex-Defense Minister Strauss. To add to the chagrin and anger caused by his removal from office, Strauss has not been given the consolation prize of Bundestag spokesman of the Christian Democratic Party. That post is held by Heinrich von Brentano, another Minister discarded by Adenauer – a year ago – on the insistence of the Free Democrats. Brentano, too, has refused to serve in an Adenauer Cabinet, but that makes him neither a friend nor ally of Strauss. There is going to be precious little elbow-room for the two men on the floor of the Bundestag. Rankling, too, in Strauss's mind is his still unsettled personal dispute with the Chancellor, whom he has insisted bore full responsibility for the government mishandling of the *Spiegel* Affair.

A Chancellor clinging to office until the last possible moment (it should not be forgotten that Adenauer

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agreed to resign "by" October, 1964, in last year's coalition pact), two government parties which are not reconciled, an awkward predicament on the floor of the Bundestag, a sense of overriding impermanence – these are shaky foundations for government. But, in addition, this last Adenauer administration faces more awkward problems than did any of its predecessors – at least in the last ten years. There is a grave budgetary problem, and the Free Democratic Minister of Finance and resolute apostle of budgetary economy, Heinz Starke, has been fired, not because he was too thrifty but because he had too short a way with other Ministers. The proposed DM 56 billion ($14 billion) budget for 1963 will almost certainly be pushed up beyond DM 60 billion. The Laender, glorified local administrators, are taking too big a share of taxation. But they will fight tooth and nail to keep that share.

Defense expenditure presents a special problem. American pressure for an increase in West Germany's conventional armed forces has so far been resisted. But the lessons of the Cuban crisis have been appreciated and in the next few months the Federal Government may come to accept the American case for increasing Germany's armed forces from 500,000 to around 700,000 men. This will cost another DM 3 billion a year.

The Trade Unions are increasingly restive, and there will be a new crop of wage-demands in the coming months. The Social Democrats are sharply critical of the failure to use the occasion of a Cabinet reshuffle to abolish superfluous Ministries – those for Family Affairs, for liaison with the Upper House of the Bundestag, and for State Property are the first three on their list. Public opinion, which for the first time since the war became really vocal during the *Spiegel* Affair, wanted a Government with a "new look" as well as a new outlook. Above all, it wanted a Government designed to survive the end of the "Adenauer era." It has not got it.

On December 12 the Trade Union Weekly, *Welt der Arbeit*, wrote caustically of the "now prolonged agony of the Adenauer era." One does not have to be a trade-unionist to agree. Can this shaky fifth Adenauer administration make a real contribution to the problems of NATO, or back President Kennedy's efforts to secure a better guarantee for West Berlin? Can it settle its internal squabbles, in order to leave after it an atmosphere in which national and European interests can be well-served? Can it even survive its appointed span of ten months? The prospects are far from encouraging.

TERENCE PRITTIE

PLANNED REFORMS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH

Revolution in Chile?

Santiago

When Chile's President Alessandri, seeking large capital loans for his country, said in Washington December 11 that his administration has instituted many reforms – in housing, land ownership and taxation – his American listeners must have been gratified. The truth about this copper-rich, bread-poor Republic wedged between the Andes and the Pacific is not so gratifying.

Facing an unspeakable slum that crouches between a gas works and a garbage dump, giant red letters proclaim: "Revolution or Misery." Six die, 40 are wounded in a demonstration over price rises brought on by devaluation of the *escudo*. Foreigners fear that this may be the moment to leave; capital, never patriotic, has already left. One walk by the gardened mansions of Santiago and another by the fly-covered slums is probably more revealing than a book of statistics, but even the statistics are grim. Although 125 out of every thousand babies die in their first year, the population is increasing by 2.6 percent annually. But nearly half of Chile's population is under 20, and so the labor force is growing at a rate of only 1.4 percent. The per-capita income dropped between 1956 and 1960 by about 1.2 percent per year. Leisure is forced on people because jobs simply are not available. Disguised rural unemployment, overblown bureaucracies, swelling service industries and proliferating petty retailers do little to expand the economic base which must support 7.7 million people this year and nearly 10 million by 1970.

From 1943 to 1958 private foreign citizens invested nearly $250 million in Chile. Over the same 15-year period these foreigners took nearly $600 million out of the country in the form of repatriated profits. This outflow, mainly to the US, represented a gift of $50 from every man, woman and child in Chile. The country desperately needs to receive aid, not give it.

What little statistical evidence we have indicates the

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distribution of income has become *less* equal. The workers have been made to suffer in three ways: (a) through an increase in unemployment; (b) through a decrease of per capita income; (c) through a regressive redistribution of income. Per capita food consumption has fallen over the past few years; the consumption of meat alone fell 36 percent from 1945 to 1957. The average height of the population is decreasing; only the height of the rich is increasing. The gap is widening between the rich and the poor, the tall and the short, the light-skinned and the dark. (Unlike other Latin American countries, Chile does not have an "Indian problem." But the social scale still begins white and rapidly shades off to dark.) The "Europeanized" Chileans – highly mobile, highly trained, frequently educated in the US – can sell their skills in any market in the world. There is a constant danger that if asked to give up their privileges, they will simply emigrate, leaving their country without the expertise to run it.

This gap between the few and the many finds expression in the impersonal pronoun "they." "Chile's whole problem is that *they* are so lazy"; "*they* are drunkards"; "*they* are immoral"; "*they* simply are different, that's all"; "*they* don't save. . . ." (If a typical Chilean worker ate nothing, wore nothing, spent nothing for one year, he would have saved only about $240 and inflation would make it even less.)

What can be done about this? The Alliance for Progress called upon Chile, like other countries, to make structural reforms as a prerequisite to US assistance. President Alessandri claims Chile has begun to meet some of these requirements, but closer examination proves this is not quite the case.

Chile's Ten Year Plan is a book of prayers; it simply projects various quantities in various sectors to achieve a desired growth figure of 5.5 percent. There is no discussion of how the goal is to be reached. The tax reform program laboriously worked out over the past two years does little more than restore the efficiency of tax collection which existed five years ago. The change is an important one, however, as a step to genuine reform, for it would increase information and gradually reduce widespread tax evasion. As a result, the scheme has opponents within the government and may never be accepted in practice.

As for agrarian reform, idealistic talk goes back almost to the arrival of the Spanish. Social upheavals in the 20's resulted in a government colonization agency. Its policy was to make every willing Chilean the owner of his own farm. In 35 years, it created 4880 family-sized farms. At the end of November a new Agrarian Reform Bill finally emerged as law. It took the old administration machinery, gave it a new name (*Corporacion de Reforma Agragia*) and romantic initials (CORA). CORA hopes to create 6,876 units in 1963. That will leave 600,000 landless *campesinos*.

The new legislation is no threat to the large landowners. Government land will be used first. After that, land will be bought on the open market – if funds are available, and none are likely to be. The Constitution requires full, immediate cash compensation. One proposal would permit payment for land in bonds whose real value is maintained by adjustments for inflation. Since land values in Chile are already inflated to anticipate price increases, this means the owner in effect will be compensated twice for inflation. This Agrarian Reform will not change the distribution of income and power. Nor is it likely to increase investment. One recent study of saving and consumption of large landholders concluded that these landholders had an average income roughly 75 times the income of the average rural family and saved about 35 percent of this income.

The new legislation seeks to create a rural middle class of family farmers. Large farms will be subdivided into units up to 30 hectares (75 acre units capable of producing an income of $3,000 in a country of an average $300 income). CORA also plans to expropriate and consolidate small land-holdings; land that heretofore barely "supported" 20 families will be consolidated and turned over to one family. These new "middle class" farms will go to those who are qualified to farm successfully, such as foremen and agricultural school graduates. The others, the *inquilinos*, will simply be dispossessed. Before, they had a house, animals, a small but steady wage, benefits like firewood and a garden plot. Now they will lose these feudal rights and will be moved to tiny orchard plots (*huertos*) which will not support them. To survive they will have to look for seasonal work on neighboring small farms or on the new, larger family unit farms. The net result of all this will be to benefit a very small minority at the expense of the great majority.

Have matters reached the point where it is a choice between "Revolution or Misery"? Chileans don't think so. The book *Revolution in Chile* is a satire on a *gringa* named Sillie Uddernut who interprets routine events as portending imminent revolution. It is a best-seller here. Chileans have a highly developed sense of ridicule, and a cynical view of politics. The first response to a bearded one in the Andes would be laughter. Chile has no revolutionary tradition and has had only one guerrilla, Manuel Rodriguez, resurrected in a lovely poem by Pablo Neruda, Latin America's greatest poet and Chile's most noted Communist. Rodriguez was shot in the back in 1819.

Then, too, the government is expert in nipping discontent in the bud. It provides new housing or political concessions to this group or that. This fragments the opposition, and by the time the opposition regroups the process is repeated.

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What of the Chileans' reaction to the United States? Unfortunately, the US, preoccupied with cold war labels, is identified as the defender of the status quo – and it is one that does not include much sense of social justice. The Left has been lumped together and dismissed as "Communist." Nevertheless, the US is not a popular whipping boy. The Left failed to mobilize the population over the Cuban blockade. Chileans riot and die over an increase in the price of bread, not over distant episodes in the cold war.

The Chilean Left has concentrated on mobilizing the urban labor movement rather than on organizing a peasant revolt, Castro-style. A well-disciplined police force and an army that traditionally remains outside politics are restraining factors. The Right is also now mobilized as never before and is supporting a large anti-Communist campaign, though the days of anti-Communist youths drilling in a secret militia are over.

JAMES BECKET *and* KEITH D. GRIFFIN

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Power Politics or a Rule of Law?

Quincy Wright Replies to Charles Burton Marshall

Recently in *The New Republic,* Charles Burton Marshall, in "Some Dour Thoughts on Inspection," stated that US threats to use force to maintain a blockade or quarantine of Cuba in time of peace was "probably not countenanced by the letter of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" which permits defense only in the case of "armed attack," and that "our *post facto* clearance with the Council of the OAS" constituted no justification because "forceable remedial action" by that body "is subordinated to Security Council approval under Article 53 of the Charter." He thought, however, that these provisions are rendered "obsolete" because "sudden, stealthy, massive weapons deployment in a nuclear age" is so dangerous that it justifies forceable defensive action prior to armed attack. But, I ask, may not preemptive or preventive war be more dangerous in the nuclear age than before?

It may be that "instant and overwhelming necessity" should in principle justify some defensive action prior to actual attack, as admitted by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline incident in 1842. This condition might be read into the term "armed attack," particularly in view of the UN Charter prohibition of "threats," as well as "use," of force in international relations. But an interpretation which would permit the initiation of nuclear war because of a unilaterally determined threat still seems to me dangerous. The presence of long-range missiles in Cuba hardly constituted an "instant and overwhelming necessity." These missiles were characterized by the United States Government as "offensive" in distinction to short-range "defensive" weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles. Perhaps international agreements should be made distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons, as attempted in the Disarmament Conference of 1934 and in the recent discussions about elimination of nuclear weapons and missiles. But no such commonly-accepted definition now exists, and military authorities continue to insist that the distinction depends not on the character of the weapons but on the use intended.

Was there any evidence that these missiles in Cuba were intended to be used offensively? Khrushchev had promised Castro that he would defend him. In view of United States complicity in the Bay of Pigs Affair, of the ambiguous statement of the President about possible future actions immediately after that affair, of the increasing vigor of demands by Senators and others for an invasion, and of the apparent endorsement of such demands by elements of the American public during the election campaign, Castro might well have feared a full-scale attack by the US. Because of overwhelming US military superiority, Castro might have perceived no possibility of defense except through the deterrent influence of missiles threatening American cities. The

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US seems to have regarded such deterrent measures as necessary for the defense of allies such as Turkey, in proximity to the superior power of the Soviet Union.

That Khrushchev intended the missiles only for defense against armed attack is supported not only by his own statement but by the care he apparently took that the missiles should not get into the control of possibly irresponsible Cubans and his willingness to withdraw them immediately after the United States had given a conditional pledge that it would not invade Cuba. Furthermore, Khrushchev seems to have recognized, by reiterating his policy of peaceful coexistence and his opposition to the belligerent policies of the Stalinists and Mao, that nuclear war is suicidal, and that methods which might lead to nuclear war are not on the program of Communist expansion. He seems to have recognized better than many American commentators, who learnedly discuss whether the United States or the Soviet Union has more missiles, that military balance-of-power conceptions are not relevant to the nuclear age. Nuclear war is not a rational instrument of policy but an instrument of suicide. If each side has enough second-strike capability to destroy the other it is unimportant which has the most "over-kill." In this situation there seems to have been no occasion for all the excitement about the missiles in Cuba – provided the United States had no intention of invasion – although, undoubtedly it would make life more comfortable in the United States to have them out.

One-Upmanship

This raises an issue of what should be the goal of American policy? Marshall suggests that it is to get "one-up." The adversary saw himself as one-up (by having missiles in Cuba); this had to be "redressed." The game of "one-upmanship" resembles the game of "chicken," which in the nuclear age may leave only the alternatives of humiliation or destruction. A more appropriate goal of policy would seem to be a stable and peaceful world in which democracy and freedom have a chance to grow. This, in fact, has been stated by most Presidents as the goal of our foreign policy. The game of one-upmanship maintains high tensions because of the great danger of accidental, irresponsible, preemptive or escalated war, even if deliberate nuclear aggression by either the US or the USSR is ruled out. It maintains a situation in which all states tend to become "garrison states" or "warfare states," and in which human freedom and democracy languish.

The UN Charter requires that "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation" or other peaceful means of their own choice, including resort to regional agencies (Article 33). Marshall thinks such a diplomatic exchange would in "high probability have lost much" because it would have "blunted the impression of resolution we wanted to convey" in the game of one-upmanship. If, however, our aim was peace and stability and the Soviets' aim was peaceful coexistence, it seems possible that the bargain eventually struck might have been negotiated before undertaking illegal unilateral action.

The UN Charter further provides that if negotiations or other bilateral means fail, then a dispute or situation threatening the peace shall be put before the United Nations (Articles 24, 37). Marshall recognizes that according to the Charter "we should have cleared a plan with the veto-bound Security Council before acting at all." But he is convinced that "the United States' determination to act thus alone in sovereign discretion had to be manifested to friend as well as opponent, as a fact requiring to be taken into account in their relations with us." He applies this to prior consultation with allies as well as with the United Nations, assuming that "the alliance can be strong only as its leading elements have and show moral capacity to act alone in an emergency."

This theory makes the United Nations, NATO and the OAS, as well as international law, subordinate to the will of the United States. If applied, it would tend toward a US empire of the world, not a world of coexisting states under law.

It is fortunate that the United States got the subsequent consent of the OAS and NATO to its "quarantine," the cooperation of the United Nations, and as a result struck a bargain with Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a conditional pledge not to invade Cuba. But Mr. Marshall takes a dim view of this bargain. "Cuba," he says, "is now unmistakably a Soviet protectorate." Perhaps the estimate made in another article in your same issue, "What Next in Cuba; an Exile's View," is more appropriate – the government of Cuba is a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of Cuba. "The future must," wrote the anti-Castro exile, "be shaped by the Cuban people."

It appears that the United States has improved its reputation for courage by manifesting a willingness to go to the brink of nuclear war without regard for its legal obligations. The Soviet Union improved its reputation for restraint in not pressing for observance of its legal rights when to do so would threaten nuclear war. Communist China seems to prefer the first type of reputation, the uncommitted states the second, though with some doubts, since Indian neutralism failed to prevent invasion by China. The issue remains. Are world opinion and government practices moving toward an increasingly dangerous game of power politics, or toward the rule of law in international relations?

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NATO DIVIDED

Nuclear Weapons, Europe and the US

by Alastair Buchan

Each year, when the outside air begins to fill with carols, the corridors of NATO begin to fill with rumors as the Ministers assemble for the main annual meeting of the Atlantic Council. This year, the rumors were flying thicker and faster than ever. The alliance is slowly moving toward a great debate on its future strategy.

If there ever was any likelihood that either Britain or France would decide to relinquish its nuclear capability and reestablish an American monopoly, the Cuba crisis significantly diminished the possibility. In both London and Paris there has been considerable admiration and support for the way in which the President and his advisers handled the situation; but Cuba has reinforced the conviction of both governments that crises can arise in which the US would act independently, and the Europeans would have to look after their own interests. Furthermore, if it pays the US to act unilaterally on occasion, the same may be true of the other leading countries in the alliance.

The Elysee argues that a small efficient French force (not necessarily the *Mirage IVs* that becomes operational in a year's time, but the solid-fuel MRBM's and the Polaris type submarines which are planned for about 1969) will not only protect France but Europe, whatever the Americans may do. The British, more versed in the pitfalls of independent nuclear power, are less ambitious. They are dubious about the wisdom of laying down a new strategic weapons system, as their own military-industrial complex is loudly urging. However, they hope to use their position as a nuclear power to help make some important progress toward nuclear arms control agreements within the next few years. In the meantime, they cannot allow the strategic credibility of their existing force to be devalued. Hence the cries of anger and anguish as it became clear that the United States planned to abandon the Skybolt air-to-ground missile, without which, in a few years time, neither US B-52's nor the British V-Bombers would be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

This raises the first of the big questions which loomed, spoken or unspoken, over Macmillan's conversations with de Gaulle and Kennedy in the week before Christmas. The technical doubts raised by Skybolt and the political doubts raised by Cuba stand against the background of the Common Market negotiations, now mired down in arguments over agriculture. Since French farmers are a major obstacle to British entry into the Common Market, and since Britain has reason to think that the US is quietly trying to kill the British nuclear force by letting Skybolt sink to the bottom of its research and development priorities, is there any basis for an Anglo-French deal?

On the face of it there is. Britain has a large nuclear reactor program, whose military components are now idling in low gear, since she has all the nuclear warheads she needs. Yet France is about to spend $900 million to build an isotope separation plant at Pierrelatte. Conversely, the French aircraft and missile industry is one of the most vigorous in the world, in terms of flexibility and quality of its research and development programs and the speed with which it can move from development to production. The recent Anglo-French agreement to build a joint supersonic airliner is evidence of the scope for fruitful collaboration between the two countries. Could not Britain save France a huge investment in nuclear warheads, while the combined resources of French and British aerospace industry freed both from dependence on America?

The answer is that neither Macmillan nor de Gaulle is at present interested in such a bargain. Both are skeptical about certain American policies, but there the common interest ends.

For one thing, Britain could only transfer enriched uranium to France. To do more would infringe her 1958 agreement with the US which forbids the transfer of any knowledge or material acquired as a result of Anglo-American cooperation. This covers the whole field of bombs and warheads. Thus an Anglo-French partnership that was of real value to France would abrogate the 1958 agreement, ending Anglo-American cooperation not only on questions of nuclear strategy but on such diplomatic initiatives as the test ban. Anglo-French cooperation on weapons could not possibly compensate Britain for such a loss.

Neither is Paris interested in such a bargain. De

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Gaulle wishes to promote the influence of France, both with the United States and in Europe. To strike a bargain with the European country he distrusts most, and in so doing to jeopardize all hopes of a closer strategic relationship with the US, does not appeal to France.

But while an Anglo-French nuclear bargain is unlikely, is it not probable that the European Community itself will, if Britain is admitted, insist on its own nuclear force? If it did, the Community would only be applying the logic of a great many official American statements (George Ball, McGeorge Bundy and others). The image of Europe as a new great power, comparable with the Soviet Union, the United States and China, rather than as a specialized economic grouping within a large alliance, is partly of American origin; Europeans can hardly be blamed for pointing out that the central attribute of a great power is the ability to pursue an independent military strategy. If the United States insists on retaining a tight control over all strategic planning and decisions, she appears to be denying in the field of military power what she is enthusiastically promoting in the field of economic power. However sound the arguments for a central control of strategic decisions – and to my mind they are overwhelming – it is this unresolved duality in American policy toward Europe which accounts for much of the skepticism with which the McNamara doctrine has been greeted in Europe. The Pentagon cannot have Western military unity if, across the Potomac, the State Department is promoting dualism.

A "Counter-City Force" for Europe

In theory, a European nuclear deterrent, even without American cooperation, is a feasible proposition. If one assumes as most continental Europeans would, that its sole purpose would be to make any Soviet attack on Western Europe itself too costly and dangerous to contemplate, rather than raising a general umbrella of protection over the whole free world as the American deterrent does, then it could be largely a counter-city force. This means it need not be very large – say 500 air, land or sea launched missiles, with a high degree of invulnerability. The entry of Britain into the Community would solve the problem of nuclear material and warheads, enabling French resources to be devoted to other projects. Drawing on the overall resources of British, French, Italian and German industry, it would seem feasible to construct a limited, but diversified force by about 1968-69. This might consist of a solid fuelled IRBM, in hardened silos in the two empty areas of Europe, the Scottish Highlands and the French Alps; a fleet of missile-firing surface ships, to be replaced by Anglo-French nuclear submarines as they came into service; supersonic low-level attack aircraft like the British TSR2; and vertical take-off planes with an air-launched missile. Given the considerably lower costs of European research and development, a crude estimate of cost suggests an expenditure of about $4.5 billion a year to create this force and keep it up to date. At present Britain and the Six spend just under $14 billion on defense, or about five percent of their combined national incomes. The added cost of an independent nuclear force would increase their expenditure to seven percent. The US now spends 11 percent and the USSR an estimated 18 percent.

I do not mean to suggest that such a program would be easy to fulfill. There are obvious technical snags. One is that European firms, for all their skill in aircraft design, have nothing like the experience in missile design and guidance of their American counterparts. Still, the knowledge that American firms have gained is now increasingly diffused throughout the scientific and technical world. Another problem is that with Algeria now a sovereign country, Europe has no nuclear test areas handy; and with no island chain off Western Europe, it would not seem easy to create a missile test range in the vicinity. Much of the development work would therefore have to be done in Australia (if she agreed) or in the French and British islands of the Pacific.

But the real difficulty concerns the control of such a force. A united Europe will not emerge like Aphrodite from the sea, and the whole success of the Community so far derives from the success of the technocrats in Brussels in helping to shape national policies so that they broadly conform to a common plan; as yet there is no agreement even on a confederal political structure. But, assuming that agreement is soon reached on the political framework of the European Community within a year, it is conceivable that the Council of Ministers could decide to create a European deterrent.

Operational control is another matter. This would require both a strong federal executive – and the advance from confederatism to federalism is a long step – combined with a real sense of identity which would make a Frenchman or a Dutchman ready to allow Italians or Englishmen to decide whether to use or withhold nuclear weapons. It can, of course, be argued that the decision to become a major nuclear power would force the creation of a strong European executive. But it could not accelerate a reconciliation of national viewpoints or a sense of common identity. Indeed, to attempt to make the European Community into an operational nuclear power might well bring the whole experiment crashing down in ruins.

Most Europeans, even serious and informed ones, have hardly begun to do more than toy with the prospect of a European deterrent. When they get down to serious reflection, three points must, I think, become clear. The first is that few German, Italian or Dutch

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leaders will be satisfied by a formula whereby the British and French nuclear forces, under national or even joint control, are called a "European" deterrent. The smaller countries are not going to subscribe resources to any scheme over which they have not a proportionate share of control, or which means substituting two parasols for the American nuclear umbrella.

The second reservation is that any attempt to create a European deterrent risks the withdrawal of the US from Europe. No American Administration is likely to accept a situation in which nearly half a million American lives could be jeopardized by European action. While to President de Gaulle this might seem the basis of a sensible Soviet-European settlement, the prospect of American withdrawal would appall most Europeans, including most Frenchmen. Moreover, there is a sound instinct in Europe that however strong European bargaining power with the US may become in the economic field, particularly when the Administration is on Europe's side as happened with the Trade Expansion Act, she could never influence American strategic policy simply by the weight of her own nuclear forces.

The third reservation concerns the Soviet Union. Russia has already good reason to fear the strength and dynamism of the European Community. Europe is the area from which the Soviet Union has always feared attack and invasion. If an increasingly dynamic Europe were to decide to acquire a powerful nuclear force, would the Soviet Union be content to do nothing during the six or eight years while the force was growing from drawing board to actuality? Might she not be tempted to exploit the vulnerability of Europe before it was too late, especially if one of the publicized motives for creating such a force was European doubt about the continuing integrity of the American commitment to Europe. If so, 20 judiciously placed Soviet 60-megaton warheads could obliterate European industrial life for half a century.

As these arguments get more widely considered throughout Europe, the indispensability of a NATO solution to the problem of nuclear weapons and the control of strategy will become apparent. But I doubt if it will be the kind of solution which certain agencies of the US Government have been advocating recently. These are of two kinds: first, there is the hardy annual, General Norstad's belief that mobile medium-range missiles must be deployed in Europe to replace her increasingly vulnerable fighter bombers. By this means, Norstad would hope to offset the growing number of Soviet intermediate-range missiles targeted on Western Europe, and to cope with a wide range of East European military targets which are of more urgent priority to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe than they are for the Strategic Air Command or the British Bomber Command. Norstad has hitherto failed to convince either the British or American governments, but it now looks as if he may win his case. Even if this missile force were internationally manned it would still be within the American command and within control arrangements that apply to the existing nuclear weapons in Europe.

The State Department's Multilateral Scheme

Of greater political significance is the State Department's attempt to lay the groundwork of a coordinated European-American strategic system by blueprinting an international force of missile-firing surface ships or submarines which would come under European control *if* the European countries could agree on a multilateral control system. Unfortunately there is some suspicion, most loudly voiced in France, that this is really an attempt to sell Europe a very expensive American weapon system in order to offset the American balance of payments. More important, most Europeans are skeptical as to whether they could evolve the multilateral control arrangements on which tthe scheme is conditioned.

Moreover, the scheme seems to me to be animated by a false hypothesis, namely that Germany will decide to become an independent nuclear power unless she shortly acquires some share in the physical control of nuclear weapons. Such a fear, which overlooks the formidable technical, legal and political difficulties which would confront Germany in making such a decision, rests on an American misreading of German apprehensions and requirements. Like all European countries, most especially those in an exposed position, West Germany is anxious to influence the framing of NATO policy, the deployment, number and targets of nuclear forces in Germany. A month before he fell from power, Franz-Josef Strauss said to me, "Germany is not a strategic power and grand strategy is not our business; it is over plans for the defense of Germany that we wish to exert our influence." With the current trend of German politics, still less is likely to be heard about independent German nuclear power. But the German Government has merely expressed more vocally what all European governments feel, namely that they have too little say in the formulation of plans that affect them all. For instance, the McNamara doctrine of a centrally (US) controlled counterforce response was evolved without any reference to allied governments. One consequence of this exclusion from nuclear policy making is that they have become preoccupied with nuclear weapons and nuclear strength, and indifferent to the non-nuclear alternatives which the United States keeps pressing them to take seriously.

The right road seems to me that suggested by Robert Osgood and others, namely to regard European control and influence over the planning of NATO strategy as

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separate from European control of operational decisions, and to seek these objectives consecutively rather than concurrently. A short step toward the attainment of the first objective was taken last spring by the creation of the Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council through which the US undertook to keep the allies informed of its strategic plans. But this is only a very limited advance for it provides no means for the resolution of conflicting views. No real progress can be made until the ramshackle political and military structure of NATO has been reorganized, so as to create the central machinery whereby an allied strategy can be hammered out, after the prolonged private argument and compromise between conflicting views with which we are all familiar in the realm of national planning. It is my own belief that as the European governments acquire greater control in the planning process that certainly Britain, and probably France also, will become satisfied with a tactical rather than a strategic nuclear force for European defense purposes only.

A NATO solution seems to me to require from the US a greater consistency of strategic doctrine, so that yesterday's orthodoxy (for instance on tactical nuclear weapons) does not become today's heresy. These rapid changes of US policy (what happened to civil defense?) undermine European confidence and make it hard to accept American pretensions to be the fount of military wisdom. The US also needs a closer correlation between political and military planning. The State Department's proposals for a European nuclear force are, for instance, basically incompatible with the McNamara doctrine. What is American policy? Finally, Washington must acknowledge that any formula for interdependence that leaves advanced technology – not necessarily for nuclear weapons – in American hands while Europe is expected to concentrate on boots and barbed wire is now fundamentally irreconcilable with European aspirations. Much of the ungenerous attitude that at present pervades European thinking on this question springs from resentment at such disastrous bargains as the unloading of the F-104 on Europe, or the Pentagon's refusal to leave the production of small missiles for the allied ground forces to the European countries. If the US tries to improve its balance of payments by selling expensive weapons to Europe, not only will it complicate its arms control policy, but it will precipitate a conflict of economic and technical ambition.

Europe, for its part, must reflect on the limitations of its own power. The mood of euphoria which the success of the Community has stimulated tends to make Europeans forget how profoundly the existence of thermonuclear weapons has affected the security of the small Asian peninsula on which its inhabitants dwell; and how limited, therefore, is its freedom of strategic choice, even though it unites into a powerful and concerted economic community.

This process of adjustment cannot be hastened by public hectoring across the Atlantic for there is now an inherent conflict of strategic interest between the United States and Europe. The United States, with world wide commitments and as the prime object of attack if nuclear war occurs, is rightly interested in creating the most flexible system of defense in Europe that is possible within the limits of Western resources. The European countries, even more vulnerable than the United States and with no geographic depth are inevitably more interested in deterrence than defense. But these are differences which can be bridged by the kind of intense private debate which occurs between the protagonists of different strategic concepts within national governments. The road to safety, therefore, lies not in grandiose blueprints for mechanical control of weapons but in revitalizing the central institutions of the alliance so that NATO can again become the focus of the argument, rather than an impotent spectator of the public quarrels of national governments.

"Cooking" the Cuban News

That Historic Week as Seen in Czechoslovakia

by Stanislav Koutnik

The former general director of the Soviet Press Agency *Tass*, Palgunov, once wrote in a brochure which later became the fundamental textbook for all Communist news agencies, that every news item or report printed must be a piece of "agitation." News must be "fighting and persuasive, and for this reason it must be explained to the reader by a properly timely commentary." Furthermore, wrote Palgunov, "Nothing can be left to chance. Readers cannot simply be given the bare facts from which they might form their own opinions."

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Just how these guide-lines apply in practice was explained by Antonin Buzek who, until recently, headed the London bureau of *Cateka*, the official Czechoslovak news agency, and, prior to that, served as the agency's managing foreign editor. He chose to ask for political asylum in Great Britain just after he had offered the post of chief of the foreign news department in Prague. He wrote: "Almost all news must be slanted, adapted to the party line or, in the cynical jargon of a Communist journalist, 'cooked.' The basic policy of *Cateka*, as far as foreign news is concerned, is to wait for a hint from Moscow – 'waiting for Tass', so to speak." (*Forum Service*, London, March, 1962.)

This technique of control over public opinion is important to keep in mind; it is the guide by which the Czech press attempted to report the events which took place between the 22nd and 28th of October – "an historical week of worldwide crisis," as the Czech press now refers to it.

President Kennedy's announcement of American measures against the Soviet installations in Cuba apparently took the Czechoslovak regime and its propaganda apparatus by complete surprise. *Rude Pravo* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party), on October 20, was still writing about "several tourist excursions which would be flying to Cuba during November and December" – without specifying what sort of "tourists" these would be. On Monday, October 22, after the President's declaration had already been made public, Radio Prague's commentator first of all reported the news of the sudden return of leading government figures to Washington, but then added: "I suppose that this campaign . . . again is being exaggerated . . . its purpose smells of propaganda and an effort to exert pressure." He amplified his forecast: "I feel, first of all, that if the United States were to mount an invasion at this time, it would have to mass a substantially increased number of air and naval forces in the Caribbean area . . . It seems most probable that Washington needs this new anti-Cuban campaign for domestic and international reasons. . . . The US Government is, thereby, attempting to justify new arms expenditures. . . . It is, from the standpoint of international politics, an attempt at creating an atmosphere which will discourage English, Norwegian and Italian shipping concerns . . . from keeping their ships on routes to Cuba . . . *Economic, political and psychological pressure is naturally a double-edged weapon. . . ,*" he said.

It is apparent from the allusions to various types of non-military pressure that the regime and its propaganda set-up were *convinced up to the very last moment* of the determination of the US President to take action in some manner other than military.

The relatively restrained Czechoslovak government declaration, run by every newspaper in the country on the 23rd of October, merely stated: "No sovereign state can allow ships sailing under its flag to be detained by another state and prevented from reaching their destination . . . nor will they permit control to be exerted over the purposes of voyages. [Note: Two Czech ships which had been on their way to Cuba returned to port.] The assumption of such a right by the United States may result in an enormous expansion of the scope of international conflicts." This declaration does not speak of any *single* conflict which could be construed to mean war, but, rather, of conflicts in general. The conflict might be nothing more than an exchange of notes of protest. Another sentence further along does not appear to regard the American blockade as aggression; it rather warns against further steps by the American Government: "Every aggressor – and the American militarists had better keep this in mind – must reckon with the fact that if he were to run the risk of committing aggression, he is certain to be repaid with a crushing retaliatory blow." In conclusion Prague declared that, "The Czechoslovak people fully and honorably intend to meet all their obligations to the Cuban Republic." Similarly cautious as well was the concurrent "spontaneous declarations of all the workers": ". . . We will, as suppliers of equipment for Cuban industry, fulfill all our commitments on time." In neither of these two declarations is mention made of either military aid or further arms shipments.

In the days that followed, every newspaper, radio station and other organ was mobilized in around-the-clock service of Soviet propaganda. Yet while the Prague regime was following the Soviet line in a reasonably meticulous manner, it did, nevertheless, deviate greatly enough from this line to merit attention. Especially noteworthy is the way in which the Czechoslovak Stalinist leadership spoke out not so much aggressively as with downright vulgarity. Thus *Rude Pravo*, on October 24, characterized President Kennedy's speech as: ". . . the sort of arrogance rarely witnessed in history. . . . Nations cannot swindle with impugnity in today's world. . . ." Radio Prague's commentator of the day spoke of "Kennedy's stupid announcement"; and several hours later, on the program "Radio Prague's Chat with Listeners," the American President was identified with Hitler: "Hitler first wanted privileges for Henlein and then eventually occupied all the border territories until, finally, he occupied us as well. The same thing could happen today, were we to give ground. After Cuba could come Berlin, then all of Germany. And then it would be our turn – but under

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even worse conditions than before. . . ." This particular broadcast of the "*Chat*" then proceeded to examine the motives behind the American move. The commentator asserted: "A puppet government composed of Cuban counter-revolutionists would be brought into play. . . . In substance, Washington is planning the creation of some sort of new government resembling Chiang Kai-shek's." The commentator supplied an interesting answer to a listener's question about "whether the American action has some connection with our preparations for signing a peace treaty with Germany." The commentator appeared to expect Khrushchev to provoke a crisis in Berlin very soon: "A really very probable connection does seem to exist. . . . Two factors are particularly evident in the case of Berlin: First of all, Berlin would be militarily indefensible for the West, and, secondly, the signing of a peace treaty is certain to mean the utter defeat of American military policy in Europe. *And this defeat is already underway. . . .*"

Radio Prague's comparison of the American Government to Hitler was snatched up the following day by every paper in the country. *Rude Pravo's* lead article ran this way: "Corporal Hitler, obsessed as he was by the self-same scheme for world domination, introduced a certain brand of crudity in his dealings. But even he, the worst mass murderer in history, took pains to provide each of his aggressions with a semblance of justification. . . . The college man sitting in the chair of the President of the United States of America has, as the representative of aggressive forces, gone even further than Hitler. . . . The inspection of imports on their way to Cuba is not only a move against freedom, but a move taken directly against humanity. . . ."

Undone in Prague

Very nearly the same words were broadcast by Radio Prague on the evening of the 25th of October in a dispatch from its New York correspondent, Karel Kyncl. Kyncl thus describes the response to the whole crisis as felt in the USA: "The only thing printed supporting the policy of the Kennedy Administration was distributed by 12 youngsters posted outside the entrance to an office here in New York. . . . There were leaflets issued by the American Nazi Party. Nothing could be more characteristic of the aims of Kennedy's policy."

During the succeeding days, after overseas radio stations had informed the Czechoslovak people that America was accusing the Soviet Union of shipping rockets with nuclear war-heads to Cuba, and of building launching pads for them, the regime maintained that these indictments were "slander and fabrication": "an egregious assertion," wrote *Rude Pravo* on October 25: "Everyone knows" it added next day, "that neither do any Soviet military installations exist in Cuba, nor are any being built" on the Caribbean island.

On Saturday, October 27, Khrushchev admitted the "universally known facts." Just how this admission tripped up Czechoslovak Communist propaganda is revealed by Radio Prague's commentator who, many hours after the admission had been made public, quoted from the Soviet newspapers *Sovietskaja Rossija* and *Pravda*, and the London *Daily Worker*, printed on the immediately preceding days, which had characterized Kennedy's disclosure of the installations as a "lie."

That evening Radio Prague's commentator offered the opinion that there would have to be an "exchange" worked out: the base in Cuba for the bases in Turkey. This was the first official Czech allusion to bases in Cuba – and, at that, it was made *en passant*. The commentator declared that, "The American demand which attempted to restrict the liquidation of rocket installations to the Western Hemisphere alone has now boomeranged back against the United States!" And, before the end of its evening transmission, the Radio broadcast a letter to Cuba "written by a Czechoslovak school-girl in the fifth grade, and published just prior to this program by *Vecerni Praha:* 'Dear Cuba, We know that you'll stand fast!' "

The press and radio had to retreat. Apparently it was a retreat which the Novotny regime wanted far less than Khrushchev. On Sunday, October 28, the entire propaganda machinery turned to autumnal sentimentality, resignation and petulent abuse. Thus *Rude Pravo's* leading article for that day, entitled "*This Sunday . . .*" began with this sentence: "This Sunday seems like any other. . . . Time passes as it usually does . . . yet once again we're one experience richer. . . . Our advance forward and our striving for peace obviously have not halted for a moment. On the contrary! They've not halted for the very reason that we know just what is happening. . . ." An outburst of rage follows: "Once again . . . and all the more vividly . . . we have seen with what unconcealed ruthlessness, with what purely Hitler-like arrogance those gentlemen in their dinner-jackets and generals' and admirals' uniforms are capable of whipping up trouble against the peace of the world. . . ."

And what of Nikita Khrushchev who had admitted that the Soviet Union did indeed have installations in Cuba, which he offered to ship back home? *Rude Pravo* and with it all the organs of Czechoslovak Communist propaganda had this to say: "In the course of a very serious crisis for which the American imperialists are to blame . . . a further significant step was taken on Saturday by the Soviet Government . . . the proposals of the Soviet Union are equable, reasonable and realistic . . . they give the world cause for hope – and more time to the imperialists to do some reconsidering . . . in order that they might finally realize that an abyss

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lies agape before all of us; that the path they have chosen will not lead to a liquidation of the crisis which has developed nor contribute to the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between states. These goals are implicit in the path chosen by the Soviet Union. It has chosen to follow this path, as it always has done in the past, because it has with it the sympathy of the entire world. . . . The Soviet Union has achieved a great new victory in its struggle for peace . . . "

Rude Pravo thereupon proceeded to instruct the population on how to help the forces of peace to victory over the danger which had been fabricated: "Each of us can contribute with his informed, citizenly demeanor, with steadfastness and discretion. . . . As always at such times as these, we are all the more strongly reinforced in the awareness of the fact that we are on the side of right, honor and law – now as in years past. All sensible people of the world now see the Soviet Union for what it truly is – it and its unchanging socialist peace policy, its stand for brotherhood and its struggle for the future of mankind. . . ." Elsewhere in the paper, bold headlines draw the reader to the contents of an important announcement: "TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF SUNDAY FOR A RAPID POTATO HARVEST."

Less conspicuous are the reports of artists and writers who had been hurriedly sent into the field by the regime to ascertain just how the people felt about the whole Cuban affair. The writer Krista Bendova sent from Bratislava a typical report: "The fact that Cuba was, in many instances, no longer being discussed seems to be a further example of the people's awareness of the issues: they are calmly and unrelentingly going about their seemingly ant-like occupations at the very moment when the threat of annihilation hangs over the world – *at a time when the bourgeoisie and nihilists are losing their nerve and sense of purpose in life. . . .* And it suddenly dawns upon you that this ant-like, steady-disciplined labor is a part of a more important historical framework. This labor does, in the final analysis, seem to say more than all the words which proclaim 'Cuba; you're not alone!' 'We're with you Cuba!' 'We shall be victorious!' "

And what should be told the school-children? An entire issue of *Rude Pravo's* "Sunday Supplement for Children" was devoted to Cuba. A school-boy named Josef Masin submitted a letter "To Pedro in Havana," in the name of all Czechoslovak children, in which he wrote: "The American President is afraid of the example which Cuban patriots are setting for the other nations of Latin America. . . . May our friendship grow even stronger!" An account is given to the children in the article entitled "Hands off Cuba, Kennedy!"

> "Do you know, dear children, what an American blockade of Cuba can do? It can cause the slowdown of production and the over-all shortage of raw materials and machinery; a lack of proper clothing, food, medicine – and even of school supplies. And that's not all. If Cuba were not to have sufficient defenses *any* aggressive state could attack and destroy it. . . . The Soviet Government forcefully responded to the challenge that the USSR would not abandon Cuba in its hour of need. You children have already read in your history books about how the valiant, courageous Soviet Union and its people defeated Hitler and liberated many lands – including Czechoslovakia – from him. . . . So don't worry, children. The Americans will have to retreat from the Caribbean!"

Milena Honzikova – apparently one of those "tourists" whose excursions were mentioned by *Rude Pravo* on October 20 – contributed an article that day, to which the children of Prague were referred:

> "There are children from three years onward in the school in Candelaria . . . fair-haired little girls whom the sun never tans; little Negro girls whose ebony skin can never pale. One of the very first notions they have about the world is

"The Missiles That Weren't Here Are All Gone."

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> "Fidel – Khrushchev – Paz." For it's only in Cuba that you can hear both *The Internationale* and the revolutionary march *Adalante Cubanos* sung naturally as the childrens' first songs. The revolution is, after all, responsible for providing everything which fills their lives. . . ."

She observed something quite different and interesting in Cardenas, where "on the previous day 200 cowardly people were in the streets, while nearly everyone else was indoors because of the rain. They were shouting that they'd had enough of the privations caused by the American embargo and that *there ought to be a surrender*. . . ." The situation the following day was, she writes, quite different:

> "Thousands came out today to give their answer. A lengthy militia review was staged. . . . Foot-soldiers passed by with automatic rifles slung over their shoulders. . . . There was something incredibly moving about the joy with which they bore their weapons along, in an over-flowing tide whose power grows in the knowledge that the fate of the revolution is in their hands. . . .

By Monday, October 29, the entire gigantic propaganda apparatus had begun to admit to realities. On radio Prague's "*Chat*," during which the question "But won't Cuba be left defenseless?" had often been asked by listeners, one of the program's participants replied: "The question of the future of Cuba will henceforth basically depend upon the agreement to which President Kennedy has already assented in principle." After a week of comparing Kennedy to Hitler, Mussolini and Nero, Czechoslovak propaganda admitted in a conciliatory manner over Radio Prague that "Cuba's future does not depend so much upon the Soviet Union as it does upon the peaceful intentions of the United States . . . the possibilities for an agreement exist, and negotiations are what are most needed at the present time."

And Those Technicians?

"This historic week" – like every other fairy-tale – had to end with a bit of moral advice. Hesitation and silence had lasted for several days. But on November 4, *Rude Pravo* finally wrote: "Looked at strictly from the view-point of international law and logic . . . the Soviet Union and the Cuban Republic demonstrated during the course of the whole affair not only a determination to defend law and order, but, as well, a maximal effort to prevent war. Hundreds of millions of people throughout the world were aware of this stand and appreciated it enormously. . . ." And Radio Bratislava indulged in some deep brooding on the same day over ". . . the pre-eminence of socialist morality over American morality." Not a single word had been uttered all the while on the fate of several Czech "technicians" in Cuba during those "critical days."

What did the people think during that week? They behaved much as they had during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. "The Cuban question" has never been popular with the people. According to the Italian daily *Il Tempo* (May 5, 1962) the chief slogan shouted during the May Day student demonstrations in Prague was "Cuba si – meat No!" France-Presse Agency reported several other slogans shouted on May Day: "We stint in great and small and to Cuba give it all!" and "Prague's lines lengthen that Havana's may shorten."

Prague's evening paper *Voderni Praha* wrote specifically about "the two Pragues" which were observable just at that time. One of them was the Prague of organized demonstrations and "unanimous protest resolutions." "And the 'other' Prague?" the writer asked: "It's really nothing more than a shadow . . . although, even so, one can't help but saying something about it. What about those scare-mongers and hoarders . . . who dodged the demonstrations in order to rush off to get to the stores before anyone else? What about them? Just what sort of front-line fighters are these? Do they expect to fight against international piracy by buying tins of cooking oil or cartons of salt? What do these people really believe in? . . . in the weight of hoarded provisions or in the power of our camp? Shame on them! Ought we not to assure our Cuban friends that we're standing solidly behind them . . . instead of massing in front of Prague's stores?"

Here, from among innumerable quotations regarding the interests of the population during the crisis, are a few sentences from a commentary broadcast by Radio Prague on October 28: "Do you know, madam, why you can't get beefsteak? We're exporting tons of meat to East Germany! And to all those African countries! And just look at all those brand-new statesmen taking trips here! All that's got to cost something, let me tell you! It's all got to come from somewhere!" The Radio's political commentator drew the following conclusion: "The most absurd nonsense is being spread about the influence of our foreign policy on our domestic situation . . . and there are many people who appear to believe that there's something to all this talk. . . ."

A final note: by November 11, Radio Bratislava was not only talking of peaceful coexistence, but also of "some kind of collaboration . . . mutual concession . . ." between capitalistic and socialistic systems. That same day, Radio Prague capped its gyrations by taking a brand new position, peaceful co-existence for the sake of "permitting the capitalistic world to slow down its acute and chronic economic problems." President Kennedy, apparently, moved in two weeks from being Hitler to being a friend who needs support.

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Black on White

by John Seelye

How effective, though bizarre, was the recent appearance in *The New Yorker* of James Baldwin's "Letter from a Region in My Mind"! His essay was as striking as the appearance of Baldwin himself at a cocktail party in Westchester, flanked by affluent, self-conscious sponsors. For it is obvious from the advertisements in *The New Yorker* that its readers have access to places where James Baldwin (in the figurative sense) cannot go. Thus, much of the effect of his presence in that magazine was due to the kind of advertising that was paying (inadvertently, perhaps) for his appearance.

It is *The New Yorker's* practice, generally, to allow each essay at least a full page at the outset; after that, the prose must take its chances. Although the first two pages of Baldwin's essay are free of any advertising, they contain a drawing of tenement fronts and a cartoon of a young man facing an intransigent banker over a desk that is under a sign reading: "Personal Loans." The young man is saying: "I hate to have to say, sir, that you are not quite everything John K. M. McCaffery has led me to expect." The tone is dry, and the reference both topical and esoteric.

On the third page there is nothing but an advertisement for a cosmetic – head, shoulders and arms of a blonde model dressed in black; the remainder of the page black with white lettering. Four kinds of type carry the message: "Give yourself the luminous look of youth with / Superglow fluid make-up. / The only make-up containing 'Lumium,' / . . . which reflects light instead of absorbing it, to give your make-up / the very glow of life. 'Superglow' is made in a wide range / of shades. One . . . was designed for you." Useless, of course, to the little old lady in Harlem.

The next two pages contain one column of Baldwin to five of advertising in which the reader is offered an "Empress Chinchilla, the precious fur for a precious few," at $1300.00 "plus tax," and a diamond clip and bracelet for a total of $18,500.00, "tax included." One is also offered – full-page, color – the opportunity to buy "A Blue Chip." The vehicle for the metaphor is a sky-blue Lincoln Continental. Walking toward the car, in the background, is a young man in a dark suit and tie, white shirt, and carrying a dark attaché case.

Then, also in color, the reader is told that "Knowledgeable people buy Imperial and they buy it by the case." A chauffeur (race obscured by a box of whiskey), walks toward a Rolls-Royce limousine. Opposing this, and slightly crowding the single column of Baldwin's essay, is a three-strand string of pearls with a diamond clasp, $150,000 (including federal tax). The pearls, as in a jeweler's display case, rest against a black background.

Turning the page, we find two opposing columns of a single perfume ad, between which is wedged a single column of Baldwin. "Leave a little of yourself," we are told, "wherever you go." On the opposite page, stands Captain Kangaroo, arms upraised behind the violin section of an orchestra. It is an announcement of a television program, and the copy below informs us that "Where Captain Kangaroo leads, children by the millions follow. With warmth and whimsy and wonderful gentleness, he instructs youngsters (to quote a Peabody Award citation) 'in safety, in ethics, in health, without interrupting the serious business of entertaining them'."

"That summer," writes James Baldwin of his fourteenth year (opposite Captain Kangaroo), "all the fears with which I had grown up, and which were now a part of me, and controlled my vision of the world, rose up like a wall between the world and me, and drove me into the church."

Moving on, we again find a single column of prose flanked, on the one side, by two columns of advertising, and on the other by a full-page promotion of a silverplate tea service (in black and white), which advises us of "a fascinating new hobby afoot: collecting silver pieces in all of the different patterns. To get the non-conformist effect, one hostess mixes this opulent Royal Rose Tea Service with a Paul Revere bowl. . . . Variety is the spice of life. Who can deny it?"

"Yes," writes Baldwin – next to Spode dinnerware ("Don't Wait to Inherit Spode") and French wine – "it does indeed mean something – something unspeakable – to be born, in a white country, an Anglo-Teutonic, antisexual country, black. You very soon, without knowing it, give up all hope of communion."

Turning the page, we find a black-and-white montage promoting a racetrack: "Jump up and down. Scream. Yell. Store up enough thrills to last you through the winter ahead. . . . Special Thanksgiving Day schedule starts at 11:00." Over against neckties and men's cologne, Baldwin tells us "that the principles governing the rites and customs of the churches in which I grew up did not differ from the principles governing the rites and customs of other churches, white. The principles were Blindness, Loneliness and Terror, the first principle necessarily and actively cultivated in order to deny the two others."

The ads continue: perfume, jewelry, liquor, sequined jackets, handkerchiefs, hats, toilet articles, a brush for mink, shoulder-cover sachets, ocean voyages ("There's a staff of 800 attendants – one for every couple. All you do is *enjoy* your trip to Europe on the SS United States"), towels (featuring a rose pattern: "Everything's rosy!")

Across from the towels, Baldwin is discussing jazz and the blues, "the

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Art of the Sonnet: 164

We ogle hate, she and I, as if love,
that last prehistoric animal, were too
slow, too burdened, too scaly, too dumb a brute;
that hate befall our thighs if we shall survive.
For hate, compressed by love, last, dying
to hate, into a creature many-sexed,
seduces our lust so doubted it must lie
as, born to evolve, we must in lessening
more spurt in hate, adaptor without end.
We shall rise and sleep in hate, then, she and
I, and sing such cunning psalms of dissonance
that we will lullaby our doubtful children
before we let them see love reconstructed huge
by child hates' prehistoric centrifuge.

Gil Orlovitz

depths out of which such an ironic tenacity comes." According to Baldwin, "White Americans seem to feel that happy songs are *happy* and sad songs are *sad*, and that, God help us, is exactly the way most white Americans sing them. . . . Only people who have been 'down the line', as the song puts it, know what this music is about."

"All is vanity," warns a full-page, full-color ad on the next page, "all is VANITY FAIR lingerie, girdles, bras." Between girdles and pearls: "Whatever white people do not know about Negroes reveals, precisely and inexorably, what they do not know about themselves."

"The white man's Heaven, sings a Black Muslim minister 'is the black man's Hell'," followed by lime-scented soap, "individually wrapped in a native handwoven hamper" from the West Indies, a "timepiece" for $950.00 ("If the concept of God has any validity or any use, it can only be to make us larger, freer, and more loving. If God cannot do this, then it is time we got rid of Him"), "flawless taste" in sweaters, executive rugs, records: "Johnny Mathis reveals the heart of a ballad when he sings" ("One did not need to prove to a Harlem audience that all white men were devils. They were merely glad to have, at last, divine corroboration of their experience. . . ."), wristwatches for $250.00 each, "Grab Bags" ("Holds a load of worldly goods plus a fortune in fashion"), blouses: "Look at me in Laneela" ("Elijah Muhammad has been able to do what generations of welfare workers and committees and resolutions and reports and housing projects and playgrounds have failed to do: to heal and redeem drunkards and junkies, to convert people who have come out of prison and to keep them out, to make men chaste and women virtuous, and to invest both the male and the female with a pride and a serenity that hang about them like an unfailing light"), crystal, jade, liquor, airlines: photo of a smiling man (white): "You'd smile too" ("You must consider what happens to this citizen" – Baldwin is speaking of a Negro veteran – "after all he has endured, when he returns – home: search, in his shoes, for a job, for a place to live; ride, in his skin on segregated buses; see, with his eyes, the signs saying 'White' and 'Colored,' and especially the signs that say 'White Ladies' and 'Colored *Women*' "), silver ice-buckets, shantung shirts, travel: "Escape to the Islands with BOAC" ("And it is this dream, this sweet possibility, that thousands of oppressed black men and women in this country now carry away with them after the Muslim minister has spoken, through the dark, noisome ghetto streets, into the hovels where so many have perished. The white God has not delivered them, perhaps the black God will"), Nassau, authentic tartan trousers, espresso coffee (instant), "Why 2 Swimming Pools?" (at "Acapulco's most famous and most fabulous resort," where "life is carefree, informal, *simpatico*"), sport shirts, cologne, cameras, shirts (white and colored), coats with "Sherpa pile linings of 100% Creslan!", children's wear: "On Christmas mornings it's usually necessary to have a red robe for sitting near the tree. I'll be marvelous in this one. It has my monogram on the pocket which is good as everyone will know who the toys are for" ("For the horrors of the American Negro's life there has been almost no language"), thermal blankets: "It's a new experience in bed-time comfort, since you're obviously comfortable, relaxed, warm, yet you hardly know you're under a blanket," "The Chianti Shift . . . very Greenwich-VILLAGER," paisley scarfs, jewelry, whiskey (brown kegs on the banks of Loch Lomond), watches, courier cases "from England," Oxford shirts, cuff links, champagne, clocks, baroque desk set, Christmas cards: "Reflections of a personality . . . and the one Christmas Card that truly reflects *your* personality awaits your selection" ("I remembered my buddies of years ago, in the hallways, with their wine and their whiskey and their tears"), silk suits, watches, belts, after-shave lotion, "23 Days in South Africa for $455" ("The Negro has been formed by this nation, for better or for worse, and does not belong to any other – not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam"), California wine (this is the center-spread, two pages of color with no room at all for Baldwin: "Tonight Could Be the Night! . . . There is always *something* to celebrate") sports cars ("Here at last is a machine that delivers all the joys and driver delights of the all-out sports car it is, with the snug comfort and smoothness of a 'sports-type car' which it sure as heck *isn't*"), wristwatches for $325.00 ("*Whoever debases others is debasing himself*"), "50 years of Irving Berlin in 3/4 time!", place card-holders, enamel-on-copper trays, rechargeable flashlights, bone china, steak knives, "In Philadelphia nearly everybody reads The Bulletin" ("In any event, the sloppy and fatuous nature of American good will can never be relied upon to deal with hard problems"), circular memo pads, "Exhibition and Sale of Rare Illuminations of the XIII, XIV, XV Centuries" ("Freedom is hard to bear"), shirts (white, with dark tie, full page, in color), Nassau and the Bahamas: "Where the islands are dressed to the nines (full page, in color, gentlemen in summer tux): "No velvet rope ever en-

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closed a more glittering assemblage," perfume: "White Shoulders, Most Precious, Great Lady, Baroness" ("He is *the* key figure in this country, and the American future is precisely as bright or as dark as his"), sherry (white snow on black kegs), rum cakes, silverware ("I cannot accept the proposition that the four-hundred-year travail of the American Negro should result merely in his attainment of the present level of the American civilization"), nylon hosiery, pumps (black), ("This past, the Negro's past, of rope, fire, torture, castration, infanticide, rape; death and humiliation; fear by day and night, fear as deep as the marrow of the bone; doubt that he was worthy of life, since everyone around him denied it; sorrow for his women, for his kinfolk, for his children, who needed his protection, and whom he could not protect; rage, hatred, and murder, hatred for white men so deep that it often turned against him and his own, and made all love, all trust, all joy impossible – this past, this endless struggle to achieve and reveal and confirm a human identity, human authority, yet contains, for all its horror, something very beautiful"), gin, business magazines, novelties: "For Weight Watchers – S.F.A.'s Measuring Belt: Hidden under its smooth calf exterior lies the truth, whether he's losing or gaining, spelled out in inches," hotels; "*Everything's* been thought of for your comfort," necklaces: "Chains abound – why not indulge yourself?" ("And here we are, at the center of the arc, trapped in the gaudiest, most valuable, and most improbable water wheel the world has ever seen"), pure silk handkerchiefs, and champagne ("*God gave Noah the rainbow sign, No more water, the fire next time!*")

What we are presented with is what the Surrealists call a "hazard" event, a coincidental (and therefore meaningful) juxtaposition of contradictory quantities. What else can be made of the conjunctive appearance of James Baldwin's essay and this catalogue of luxury. Crushed between the stones of solace is the sound of agony.

"Simplify!" said Thoreau, three times over, and although *The New Yorker*, largely through the efforts of E. B. White, has an interest in *Walden*, I do not wish to imply that the magazine, because it fills its pages with advertisements for useless junk, is being hypocritical. On the contrary, I should like to praise *The New Yorker* for its courage in printing James Baldwin's essay amidst the overwhelming evidence of the material concerns of its readers. It is an effort which bears comparison with Thoreau's erection of a shack in 1840 Massachusetts. On the verso of the advertisement for champagne which faces the last page of Baldwin's essay, there is a color advertisement for face powder, which brings the circle full round. On a field of black, four shades of powder have been spread in even, tangent rows, and placed on this banner are three compacts: one black, one gold, one black, gold, and white. Below, the paper is white, the ink is black.

In our culture, it might be said, white wars with black. Only in art do they harmonize, white on black, black on white. No books are banned in the South because of the miscegenatory mixture of ink and paper. Is there not hope here? "Black people," notes Baldwin, "are very beautiful." If the world of James Baldwin is one which is split into blacks and whites, so is the world of *The New Yorker*, of pearls and velvet, silver and ebony, powder and mascara, whitewalls and tuxedos. To join those two worlds, it seems to me, would be as simple and as effective as placing pearls against black velvet.

Through Distorted Lenses Darkly

by Melville J. Ruggles

Entering the last lap of his Castro-Stevenson-Kennedy relay race in the last week of November, Mikoyan paused long enough to utter a statesmanlike pronouncement: "The first condition for progress in negotiation is to understand each other correctly and well." Greater understanding does not necessarily lead to greater sympathy or affection, but, as Gertrude Stein said, familiarity does breed more familiarity.

Soviet Attitudes Toward American Writing
by Deming Brown
(Princeton; $6)

Deming Brown has given us a study of how Soviet authorities have dealt up to now with one aspect of the problem of understanding America. It is a sorry record. Strenuous effort has been exerted throughout the past forty years to prevent the Russian people from getting a true image of the US through the novels, plays and poems of American writers. There is a double screening process: first the selection of what may be translated and published and then the interpretation of the Soviet critics.

Mr. Brown's account is replete with the twists and turns of aesthetic "theory" as it accommodated itself to the ever swiftly changing Party Line. The text is impressive for the amount of scholarly research, but much of it suffers from monotony. There is a basic reason for the lack of lustre in large parts of Mr. Brown's recital. He identifies it himself when he writes: "The Soviet critic is held fast by a doctrinal anchor," being constrained by a "rigid dogmatism which permits few subtleties and uncertainties." Literary criticism thus stultified can be interesting to few other than specialized scholars.

The author provides relief for the ordinary reader, however, in an interesting concluding chapter where he summarizes and interprets what has gone before. Non-specialists will also find much of interest in the "case studies" of criticism of selected American writers who have been widely read in the USSR. In these chapters Mr. Brown permits himself to speculate about what actually got through to the Soviet reader between 1920 and 1960. The case of Hemingway is particularly interesting. His Anglo-Saxon under-playing of emotion and his laconic characters would, one would think, seem alien to the Slavic temperament. Professor Brown suggests what it is in Hemingway's writings that resonates with the Russian reader:

> "... his vigorous love of nature, sports, combat, and adventure must appeal to the Russians. This clean,

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rugged outlook on life (despite its elements of bravado, of which the critics took due note) strikes the same chord in the Russian heart as do the stories of London. In the Russians there is a strong love of the primitive, and a comparable distaste for the sophisticated, which amounts at times to a puritanical attitude toward the 'decadent' trappings of civilization. The unmistakable longing for a simpler, purer, and more elemental life which rings in Hemingway's stories must find response in this part of the Soviet reader's nature. Ultimately it is Hemingway's profound understanding of the natural aspirations of men which appeals to the Russian public."

There are some lacunae in Brown's book. His decision to concentrate on the Soviet treatment of 20th Century American writers perhap led him to omit mention of the *Literary Gazette's* assault on Charles Neider, editor of Mark Twain's autobiography. But in view of the impact of this episode on US literary circles, readers would have welcomed discussion of it in a book entitled *Soviet Attitudes toward American Writing.*

Understanding is, of course, a two-way street. Russians constantly complain that while American writers appear in millions of copies in the USSR, only a few Soviet writers are translated and published in the US. There may be enough substance in their protest to make it worthwhile for US publishers to take a closer look at the Soviet literary product; and there are undoubtedly US publishers who would be eager to publish some of those manuscripts by Soviet writers which Soviet publishers reject or which are never submitted to a Soviet publisher. But their fascination with statistics mislead Soviet citizens who make the above complaint. In the decade after World War II, ten American authors were published in the USSR in editions of from nine million to one million each. They were (in this order): Dreiser, London, Twain, James Fenimore Cooper, O. Henry, Howard Fast, Harriet Beecher Stowe (represented by *Uncle Tom's Cabin* only), Upton Sinclair, Bret Harte, Albert Maltz. These authors are no more representative of the US in the middle of the 20th Century than Tolstoi, Dostoevsky and Pasternak (published in large editions in the US) are representative of Soviet Russia. Moreover, as Professor Brown points out, complaints that the "quantity of American literature printed in the USSR is greater than the quantity of Soviet literature printed in the United States" are "beside the point, since the proper question is not one of quantity but of quality:

> "Had Soviet literature proved generally attractive to American readers, the publishing houses of the United States would gladly have satisfied the market, whereas American works, in order to reach the Soviet public, had first to pass through the thick filters of official censorship. Soviet readers have never been really free to choose among contemporary American works, and it is a tribute to the vitality of American writers that with even a limited choice, the Soviet public maintained an affection for them. The point is that, had official shackles been removed, contemporary American

To Get There

To get there do not take the straight way,
Go by the back way through the private gateway.
Eyes on mapped arteries are keen
For faltering travellers, no sooner seen
Than stuck in the kidney; jackals
Follow in packs, and suchlike rascals.
You walk wide open, public bull's-eye,
Soon betrayed and guided falsely.

To get there do not take the back way
Go by the wilds and not on any trackway.
Thieves haunt the byways when they are grown sly:
Once waylaid and who would hear your cry
(If you could cry, with daylight in your throat)?
Dangerous darkness hangs in the forest skirt:
You go the roundabout way to die.

To get there set no foot on land,
Take the boat that plies at the sea-strand.
The wilds are treacherous, matted, up-hill,
And what the bogs don't get the rhinos will:
Snakes fall in coils from poison-ivy trees.
That's why the roads were made, to avoid these.

To get there do not take the boat,
Plunge, swim awake and sleeping float.
Water is wary stuff: boat lulls asleep
In swaddling cot-clothes, then the ingenious deep
Slides back the hull and down you drowning go.
You will never get there if you end so.

To get there avoid water; better to fly.
Have you signed compacts with Behemoth? Why
Will he not devour you, and the griddle sun
Not burn you black by day?
You will be your lifetime on that three-week way.

Flying is foolish, happening to have no wings.
Sit still and think it to you. Things
Are grasped in armchairs out of run of horses.
Mind fetches planets from their courses.

He who sits still is lost,
Make no doubt of it, thought
Even across a pumpyard never brought
The sitter ever yet there.
If you sit still you are lost.

If once you are lost you will never get there.

Hilary Corke

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writing would have been much more popular than it was."

Mr. Brown occasionally succumbs to the human temptation to strike back when slapped at, and to use loaded words. A reader might question whether he may also sometimes retaliate in kind with the typically Soviet device of quoting out of context. And he might be vulnerable to criticism from Soviet sources for not mentioning Khrushchev's speech at the Third Writers' Congress in May, 1959, where the Soviet leader not only adopted a remarkably impartial judicial role in the open fight between the Thawers and the Icemen (the anti-Stalinists and the neo-Stalinists), but delivered himself of what sounded like a major pronouncement on literary criticism. He told the writers, critics and publishers present not to "burden the government" with decisions on what should or should not be published, but to decide for themselves, adding: "In my opinion this will be criticism, real criticism."

The author's greatest shortcoming, however, is one he shares with the majority of scholars of Slavic affairs in the US. Too much of the erudition is derived from books, too little from first-hand experience in the Soviet Union. If Mr. Brown had had the opportunity to live in the Soviet Union for two or three years he would have learned that while politics is indeed basic, quirks of personality, personal ambition and other human traits also influence writers and critics. He would also have acquired more tolerance for the bitter and savage polemics which seem to be inherent in Russian literary controversy. (Soviet writers fare no better than foreign in the hands of Soviet critics.)

Nevertheless, Brown demonstrates that the swinging pendulum of Soviet criticism has an immovable axis of suspension: the dogma that the purpose of art is to serve the interests of the state. He also indicates, though he understresses, that the personal taste of the dictator has as much force as any "theory" of aesthetics. Seldom in Soviet history were these two constants more vividly displayed than in the period between the last week in November and the first week of December, 1962. First Khrushchev was reported to have ordered, at the final session of the Central Committee, that restrictions on artistic expression be removed. Various moves (such as the announced demise of the neo-Stalinist organ *Literature and Life*) seemed to confirm the report. Abstract painters took heart and hung daring canvasses in the Manezh at the foot of the Kremlin. Khrushchev took on a horrified look and pronounced the paintings "daubed by a donkey's tail." A few days later *Pravda*, taking (or taking advantage of) the cue, thunderously accused many Soviet artists, writers and composers of betraying "socialist realism" in falling under the influence of modern Western style which was defined as "all-forgiving liberalism or rotten sentimental complacency."

One might wish that, despite its shortcomings, Brown's book could set a precedent. The millenium will have come when a Soviet scholar produces a book on American attitudes toward Soviet writing that would be no less thorough and objective than Brown's. It would be an important contribution to Mikoyan's goal: mutual understanding.

A Minimum Solution for Berlin

by Gar Alperovitz

Fred Warner Neal's *War and Peace and Germany* opens provocatively: "One cannot question the high and solemn American resolve not to be pushed out of Berlin. There is only one baffling aspect about it: it is by no means clear that *anybody is threatening to push us out of Berlin.*"

Because such a drastic assertion demands explanation it is a useful way to begin a book offering an alternative theory of what the Berlin crisis is about and a proposal for a minimum solution to the problem. Neal suggests that, in the perspective of history, the Berlin story has been overdone. He asks that we discard "stand-firm" cliches and undertake a closer exploration of the elements of the crisis: "One may safely assume that the Russians would like to have the United States and its allies get out of Berlin, just as we would like to have them get out of Berlin. . . . But that is not what they are proposing."

War and Peace and Germany
by Fred Warner Neal
(Norton; $3.95)

"The Russians have proposed an alteration of the situation in Berlin – which by our own definition is undesirable in present form – and they have asserted that *if* we cannot agree on their proposal – *or on some other proposal* – they would take action which *might* open the door to the East Germans trying to force us out if we didn't deal with them. . . . But the Russians at the same time proposed – even urged – so many possibilities for our staying in Berlin and for preserving – even guaranteeing – the freedom of West Berlin that their proposal amounts to . . . one of the gentlest threats on record."

Neal suggests we take the Russians up

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on their proposals and get down to the old fashioned work of diplomacy. He urges a treaty in which the USSR and East Germany give guarantees for the freedom of West Berlin and access to it. He feels the Russians could be induced to drop demands for token Soviet troops in West Berlin were we to agree to neutralize the city by halting espionage and propaganda activities there. (The latter is a modification of the official US proposal of 1959.) And he thinks a UN presence in Berlin could help save face for all concerned.

One may well question the specifics. For example, Soviet stubborn demands to station their troops in West Berlin have already tripped up exploratory negotiations. It is questionable, moreover, whether the West need go so far as to sign a treaty with the Soviets to solve the problem. The British have urged guarantees for access and for Berlin in a treaty restricted to the Soviets and East Germany. What is probably the real essential is *de facto* recognition of East Germany by the West. If the West is prepared to agree to this, it is likely that the USSR is prepared to give as many guarantees as the US, the UN, and the neutrals can devise.

Neal points out that a new arrangement in Germany could give legal guarantees for our position in Berlin which we do not have today. As the author shows, the vague wartime agreements on which the State Department places so much emphasis have been broken by the US as well as the USSR so often that they now are a dead letter.

To suggest that we calm down about Berlin seems a radical idea. But it is well to remember that Neal, a former State Department official, is only suggesting that we return to the traditional methods of diplomacy. His minimum solution is based on negotiation, careful compromise, and written guarantees. To those who suggest that you can never trust a Russian, Neal responds: "If we wanted to go to war over our rights in Berlin . . . we could do so under conditions of a peace treaty as well as we can now." For the sanction any negotiated agreement would carry is the same thermonuclear sanction guaranteeing our present ill-defined position. "The handful of American troops in the city no more keeps the Russians out than do the West Berlin Boy Scouts."

Artist at Work

"There's no need to know each other to love," the heroine of *Eclipse* responds to her lover's question; then adds pensively, "Perhaps there's no need to love." If these statements are not specifically the theme of Michelangelo Antonioni's new film, at least they outline the domain in which it lives. *Eclipse* is the third part of what he considers a trilogy, with *L'Avventura* and *The Night:* three varying inquiries about the nature and possibility of love in our time, inquiries as to whether love – which, as we understand it, is after all a relatively recent invention – is in a crisis similar to those of religion and social organization.

Eclipse (Times); *Il Grido* (Astor)

Vittoria is a modern girl in modern Rome, and we must appreciate, to begin with, that this is different from being modern in New York or Cleveland. In a city where automobiles use a bridge that was built in 50 BC, change is not integral in the mode of life. The calendar and the clock either bereave you or liberate you, depending on your viewpoint, but you are always conscious of difference from the past. Vittoria, clad in chic dresses, moves against apartment walls covered with the latest art, in a district of Rome so new that the air seems to quiver with atonal chords. She and this district seem "un-placed"; when she goes down into the heart of old Rome, she seems Italian.

Here is all that happens in the film: Vittoria leaves a man named Riccardo with whom she has had a long affair, having ceased to love him. One day she goes to the Borsa, the Roman stock exchange (which is built in the ruins of an ancient temple!), to see her mother. The mother, a widow, has substituted money-drive for sex and is daily in the Borsa to tend her holdings. Vittoria meets Piero, her mother's young broker. In the course of a few days the pair are mutually attracted, fall in love, begin an affair. At the end they are happy with each other, but both are haunted by a presentiment that their love – that love itself – cannot last.

With this slender story, Antonioni evokes a city, an era, a psyche. His now-celebrated eye for texture and composition is, if anything, clearer. His sense of rhythm is acute. And what has become his hallmark – a feeling of purity, of absolute control and dedication – is manifest from first to last. In *Eclipse* he intensifies certain of his colors; some contrasts are stronger than those he has used before. The opening and closing scenes are long passages of silence; and in the body of the film there are passages of manic frenzy.

The opening sequence, about three minutes, is in Riccardo's apartment at daybreak. He and Vittoria, exhausted by a night of pleading, refusal, quarreling, have nothing left to say; the fan whirs in the room heavy with argument. She needs to gather her strength even to speak the final goodbye. The closing sequence is a series of shots of Vittoria's neighborhood, as afternoon wanes into twilight – about seven minutes without dialogue and without any of the principals.

This closing sequence has already caused much discussion. It has been called by some the ultimate bankruptcy of Antonioni's style. By others it has been seen as his statement that man must come to terms with his new environment before he can love. Others have seen it as a symbolic message conveyed by shots of a nurse wheeling a child, a jet-plane's vapor trail, the headlines about atomic war and peace in the newspapers carried by homecoming working people. I offer no alternative "key" because I don't view the sequence as a cryptogram. To me it is simply a sounding-board against which the story, now ended, resonates for a while, as a pedal may hold the closing notes of a piano piece. The drama, as such, is finished, but Antonioni doesn't want the film to finish yet, he wants us to linger in the specifics of the film's world and to let the story echo. It is

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JULES FEIFFER

ONE NIGHT- AT A PARTY- I WAS IN AN ARGUMENT WHEN SUDDENLY, JUST WHEN I WAS ABOUT TO APPLY THE CRUSHER AND QUOTE STATISTICS FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL - I REALIZED I DIDN'T BELIEVE A **SINGLE WORD** I WAS SAYING.

AND I DIDN'T BELIEVE A SINGLE WORD MY OPPONENT WAS SAYING. AND I THOUGHT FURTHER AND I REALIZED THAT I DIDN'T BELIEVE A SINGLE ARGUMENT I HAD HEARD ALL EVENING OR A SINGLE NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL I HAD READ IN **MONTHS**.

AND THEN IT CAME TO ME THAT I HADN'T BELIEVED ANYTHING ANYBODY HAD TOLD ME IN **YEARS**. THAT DEEP INSIDE THE ONLY THING I **REALLY** BELIEVED WAS THAT **EVERYBODY** WAS **LYING!**

THAT IT WAS **ALL** SPECIAL PLEADING.. GIRLS! JOBS! GOVERNMENT! ME! **EVERY-THING!**

AND SO I GOT VERY DEPRESSED. BECAUSE IF LIES **WERE** THE ONLY THING ANYONE COULD BELIEVE IN HOW DOES ONE GO ABOUT SELECTING THE **BEST** LIE. THE ONE THAT MAKES YOU **FEEL** BETTER?

BUT THEN **ANOTHER** THOUGHT CAME TO MIND- WAS **I** SO WELL INFORMED THAT I COULD AFFORD TO MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS? WEREN'T THERE OTHERS IN POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY FAR BETTER TRAINED IN THE COMPLEXITY OF OUR TIMES WHOSE GUIDANCE I SHOULD ACCEPT- ESPECIALLY WHEN MY **OWN** CONCLUSIONS WERE SO BADLY CONFUSED?

AND WASN'T MY BELIEF THAT EVERYTHING WAS A LIE ONLY A DEVICE TO ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY? REALIZING THIS I BECAME **HUMBLE**. I CAME TO A **NEW** BELIEF-

-TO ACCEPT GUIDANCE. TO HAVE TRUST IN THE GOOD SENSE OF THE EXPERTS.

THAT IS WHAT I HAVE FINALLY COME TO BELIEVE.

MY LIE, RIGHT OR WRONG.

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quite simple and quite daring, and it is not trick. It is an action in art by a self-confident artist.

The contrast with the above – the frenzy – is in the Borsa scenes, a wild arena that churns with continuous rush and clamor, but the men in it are inwardly calm, precise, predatory. The residual effect is something like that of opera: people standing next to each other scream at each other because that is the norm of the place. Antonioni makes it difficult for you to believe (which is his point, of course) that these scenes occur on the same planet as the film's opening and closing scenes. The Borsa sequences are the hyperbole of the frenzy that underlies all our lives. (Their noise is teased by an interruption – a minute's silence for a deceased member, which is obscenely funny because in the silence we can hear the brokers' brains turning over.)

Vittoria's parting with her first lover, the meeting and involvement with his successor, are shown with remorseless and rewarding truth. Antonioni is so sure of his truth that only a few (film) minutes after Piero and Vittoria skirmish into bed, he has them do a burlesque of the encounter – on a later day – already able to laugh at their first, aggressive, naturally antagonistic intercourse. Less successful for me was a sequence in which Vittoria visits the apartment of a Kenya-born Englishwoman, inspects Kenyan photographs, then blacks up and does a parody native dance. It is well-enough done, but it is peripheral; its implications – about the clarity of primitive life – might have been taken for granted.

On the whole, however, the picture provides a stream of small stabs, shocks, gratifications. An airplane flight to Verona, which is an interlude of joyous unattachment between the two affairs; the episode in which Vittoria follows a fat, flat-footed man who has just lost a fortune in the market, picks up a scrap of paper on which he has idly doodled at a café table, and finds that he has been drawing flowers; the sequence of the courteous drunk who bows from the street to Vittoria in her window, then steals Piero's car and ends up dead in a lake – all these have a Chekhovian touch: non-extraordinary events, poignant enough in life, made more poignant not by heightening but simply by being extracted from life and juxtaposed in art.

Yet, although *Eclipse* is as consistently interesting as the other two films in the trilogy, it is not nearly as moving. I think this is because Vittoria is more a symbol than a person – almost a pageant-figure, the Spirit of the Modern Girl. Her uncertainties and frustrations seem selected to represent a social group, rather than to create *her*. A large part of the reason for this – the sense that she is a compilation of recognizable problems rather than a person in her own right – is that we get from Vittoria no feeling of individual motion. We have no idea of the possibilities from which uncertainties have kept her. She is not even a bona fide floater. All we know about her non-sex life is that she does translations. (Does this pay her considerable rent and clothes bill?) The architect in *L'Avventura*, the novelist in *The Night*, were men whose possibly fruitful and happy lives we could see, were harrowed up and thwarted. We are asked to feel much the same about Vittoria but without the same basis. I am not saying that she ought to be a frustrated artist or intellectual. But if we could sense that there was *something* she wanted in life to which contemporary malaise was an impediment – even if it was only to be a happy floater – it would deepen her shadows, make her a woman. Her context and presentation are so beautiful that we must be interested in her, but the sadness of the earlier films – of an *individual's* condition – is missing.

Monica Vitti does her best with the role, which is a great deal. She has *sagesse*, humor, sensitivity. But she lacks the materials she was given previously: the fascinated horror of the girl in *L'Avventura* watching herself fall into the arms of the lover of a friend so lately presumed dead; the precocious maturity of the rich girl in *The Night* who sees herself being used as an emotional refuge by an older couple. Here she has little character.

Piero is inevitably more vivid because he is enormously active in a job he enjoys, and is not coarsened by it. He resembles the hero of Walker Percy's novel, *The Moviegoer* – also a stockbroker – who says:

> "Money is a good counterpoise to beauty. Beauty, the quest of beauty alone, is a whoredom. Ten years ago I pursued beauty and gave no thought to money. I listened to the lovely tunes of Mahler and felt a sickness in my very soul. Now I pursue money and on the whole feel better."

This effect, of deliberately choosing to live in worldliness without surrendering to it, is heightened by the casting of Alain Delon as Piero. His gray-eyed poetic face shouting buy and sell orders across the Borsa pit is an epitome of the necessary paradoxes of our time.

Il Grido (The Outcry), made in 1957, Antonioni's last film before the trilogy, was released here recently and offers substantial comparisons. The story of an itinerant mechanic who wanders through the Po Valley with his small daughter after his woman leaves him, it is a meaty but relatively unrefined film. There is little in it of what we would now call Antonioni's style. (Chiefly a scene where the child wanders through a group of asylum inmates who have been taken out for a walk.) But two points about it are closely related to his subsequent work. First, it begins with a woman leaving a man, as do all the films in the trilogy. In *L'Avventura* and *Eclipse*, the parting is literal; in *The Night* the wife has figuratively left her husband. Second, it is a chronicle of a human being looking for a modus vivendi in a hostile world. In *Il Grido* the story, emotionally impelled, gathers social-political weight and includes some dollops of propaganda. (The old man teaching the child the *Internationale*, the peasants' demonstration against

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John Seelye *is a member of the English faculty of the University of California at Berkeley.* Gil Orlovitz's *poem is part of a larger work in progress.* Melville J. Ruggles, *who spent two years at the US embassy in Moscow, is vice-president of the Council on Library Resources.* Hilary Corke's *newest book is* The Early Drowned. Gar Alperovitz *is a legislative assistant in the House of Representatives.*

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the air base.) In the trilogy Antonioni has moved inward; one may infer that he no longer sees solutions in dogma of any kind.

With this inward movement his style has flowered, has left poster-like demonstration for poetic scrutiny. He now has such mastery of the vocabulary of film that he can violate rules to his purpose. For example, there are no dissolves in *Eclipse*, yet there is no choppiness of transition; the miraculously keen editing makes time his servant. One feels in his work, as one does rarely in any art, that he has said exactly what he wants to say exactly as he wants to say it.

But if there is not a flabby or false moment in *Eclipse*, it has none of the overpowering emotional quality of the previous two films. And, undeniably, it has some visual effects reminiscent of those films – like the heads seen against stark white walls. Whether these repetitions are design or limitation it is not yet possible to say. In a real sense we won't know all about *Eclipse* until we see Antonioni's future work. Meanwhile, although I cannot claim the enthusiasm for this picture that I have for its two predecessors, it is a happiness to know that, in the muddled, half-strangulated world of film, a powerful and pure artist continues to work.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

Naked Lunch

Sirs:

What's going on in the literary section of *The New Republic* these days? First there was Joseph Heller's notorious review of Alfred Kazin's *Contempories:* a nauseous job that with its sour spite and the bad taste it left. Now comes John Wain's intolerably priggish attack on Burroughs' *Naked Lunch.*

Wain compares *Naked Lunch* to a literary fake (Macpherson's *Ossian*), to a cheap best-seller *(Peyton Place)* and summarily dismisses it as "the merest trash, not worth a second glance." On what basis does Wain make these insulting comparisons?

Wain's main point is that *Naked Lunch* is "unreservedly on the side of death," while even a "pornographic novel" is, according to him "on the side of something describable as life." Now it is a commonplace that much of modern literature deals with the idea of death: titles like *Death in Venice* or *The Wasteland* or *The Dead* or *Death on the Installment Plan* are suggestive enough. It is clear too that many modern writers (I am quoting from R.W.B. Lewis' excellent study, *The Picaresque Saint*) have been both fascinated and ambivalent in their reaction to death and the dead world they look out upon. That refined student of literature, Eric Auerbach, says (I am still quoting from Lewis' book) that the reality represented by 20th Century fiction differs from that of any earlier period in its coloration by the disdain and revulsion of its observers. Although Auerbach condemns Joyce and other modern writers for their "hopelessness" it is not so clear that these artists are wrong – and, in any case, what we might be able to accept from Auerbach is impossible to swallow in Wain's moralizing context. *Not to mention the fact that Wain completely shirks his critical duty: he never tells the reader what* Naked Lunch *is about; he is content with invidious comparisons and a blanket dismissal. Could it be that the English novelist is frightened by the macabre homosexual hijinks that gives* Naked Lunch *its distinctive flavor?*

Be that as it may, what is Wain's life-death dichotomy but the most errant philistinism? One has heard so many Americans (*and* Russians! – being *for* life is called "Socialist realism" in the USSR) declaiming on the bright side of things (while they get steadily worse) that it is disheartening to hear an Englishman (a countryman of such bold spirits as Kenneth Tynan, Angus Wilson, and just recently and so brilliantly Doris Lessing) repeating this cant. We doubt Wain will come out soon for optimism as against pessimism. If he declares himself publicly against sin, he might run for political office in Kansas!

As for the overestimation of *Naked Lunch* by various critics to which Wain alludes, such overestimation is a fact of our time and Mr. Wain's reputation as a novelist is surely an instance of it. He may be on the side of life (whatever

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that means) but his own novels are "dead" enough.

Mr. Wain belongs to a group that includes beatniks as well as academicians, moralistic epigones of Leavis (I do not know whether Mr. Wain is or is not in sympathy with Leavis but what is striking is that in the course of a short article he manages to use the word "responsibility" four times!): all great "celebrators" of life, partisans of "gusto." Beatnik, genteel novelist or academician, they are all in fact timid souls, "frightened young men."

I hope Wain's unjust strictures will not keep cultured readers from Burroughs' serious and original novel.

George Siegel
Cambridge, Massachusetts

May I, in what Mr. Kostelanetz (December 15) might call senile youthfulness, take my stand firmly and unequivocally with John Wain on the matter of *Naked Lunch?* If John Wain has, as Mr. Kostelanetz states, because of his review of *Naked Lunch,* disqualified himself "from saying anything significant about the new in modern literature," then I feel I too must be disqualified. By what odd combination of circumstances and defenses has *Naked Lunch* become the yardstick for measuring critical acumen? Who in the world is afraid of *Naked Lunch?* Kafka, despite Mr. Kostelanetz's insistence, would never have got beyond the second page. He was enthralled by the social and moral issues of which Charles Dickens wrote, as we know.

Kay Boyle
Rowayton, Connecticut

Homicidal Insanity

Sirs:

Gerald W. Johnson's accusations (December 8) of carelessness in the release of potentially homicidal mental patients by psychiatric institutions are made with a degree of seriousness and alarm that should demand that they be considered thoughtfully by the psychiatric profession. As a fourth-year medical student planning soon to enter that profession, I can speak only from the threshold, not from deep within the edifice of psychiatric knowledge, from where the answer to Mr. Johnson should come.

Nevertheless, several points can be made from my vantage point. The first is that Mr. Johnson does not substantiate his charge that maniacal killing is "increasing with sinister speed all over the world." He says, in fact, that it just "appears" to be increasing, but he does not go to the next step, which is to wonder whether the popular press may have a role in creating that appearance. Here in Boston the "Mad Strangler" has commanded headlines for six months, while he is credited with perhaps a half-dozen deaths, almost certainly fewer than those caused by killers who are less sensationally insane. If they could be obtained, the statistics on maniacal killing would be important for discussion in this regard.

A second point relates to the term "discharged." The ways psychiatric treatment are ended are various and confusing, but the modern emphasis on patient responsibility and "open" wards has blurred the meanings of terms such as "discharged," "escaped," and others. A defense of this new "open" concept would be burdensome here, but the feeling of most of the profession is that its use has greatly reduced the grand total of violence perpetrated in the community of patients.

The third point is a little broader, but still relevant to Mr. Johnson's accusations. It must be remembered that psychiatry is a young profession. It has not been the "main line of defense" against homicidal maniacs for very much of mankind's history; even in Lizzy Borden's day such insanity was a problem for the law. If the medical defense against the spread of fatal virus infections in the community is weak, so is it also against the fatal disease Mr. Johnson is discussing. Not only is the epidemiology of mental illness poorly understood, but also the science of its prognosis. There is no way of preventing relapse, or of predicting it. Mr. Johnson is right to point this up; it concerns psychiatrists, too. Consider

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the problem of suicide, which is less sensational, yet takes twice as many lives as all types of murder yearly. These questions of life and death, and others of less moral importance such as the vast number of useful members of society crippled with mental illness, are not easy nuts to crack. Perhaps some psychiatrists are betrayed by a bloated estimation of the power of their own "magic," as Mr. Johnson intimates, but it is more usual to find them deeply concerned by the obvious incompleteness of the present psychiatric armamentarium. To the families of the senselessly slain this thought can be little comfort, but to Mr. Johnson, one of the most unsuperficial observers abroad today, it should be heartening.

Stephen D. Howard
Boston, Mass.

More on the Elections

Sirs:

Your analysis of the elections struck this observer as somewhat incomplete.

It is certainly apparent that President Kennedy pulled the sieve-like "quarantine" of Cuba because the Republicans were about to clobber him as a result of his lack of initiative. His numbers game over the first date he had received "hard" intelligence about the missile buildup didn't square with reports prevalent in the Florida press, at least, about the situation, some placing the receipt of IRBM's two to three months before JFK apparently knew anything about it.

Although you discussed the Dole-Breeding race, you failed to mention that in Massachusetts, liberal Thomas J. Lane lost to conservative Republican Bradford Morse in a heavily Democratic district; in New York, liberal Democrat Alfred Santangelo lost to Republican Paul Fino; in Illinois, liberal Democrat Peter Mack lost to ultraconservative Paul Findley; in North Carolina, middle-road Democrat Paul Kitchin lost to conservative Republican Charles Jonas in a district that the legislature had tailored for the Democrat, and in West Virginia, ultra-liberal Democrat Cleveland Bailey lost to conservative Republican Arch Moore.

The Burke-Snyder contest in Louisville hardly was decided by the Morton landslide because Morton is only a little less liberal than Wilson Wyatt and not exactly the darling of conservative Republicans. And how about the additional GOP seat in Tennessee? Taken from a Kennedy man who had defeated the incumbent!

One final note: Liberal Democrat Don Magnuson, who was seeking his sixth term in Seattle, was defeated by a political novice, and another political novice, a Lutheran minister, gave Sen. Warren Magnuson the scare of his life and appears to be a strong contender for the governorship. How do you figure these races?

J. Richard Milne
Fort Lauderdale, Florida

What Cuban Refugees?

Sirs:

In your December 15 issue there is a letter by Garibaldi Laguardia from Santurce, Puerto Rico, in which he claims there are "600,000 Cuban refugees in our country." As far as facts are known, there are no more than 80,000 in the US and some 15,000 in Puerto Rico. Which is "our country"? To me, a Puerto Rican, my country is Puerto Rico. In fact, most of the Cuban emigrés belong to the upper strata – those who had accepted the Batista dictatorship. The overwhelming majority of the Cuban people are behind Castro. The militia, the army, are armed to the teeth. If they did not like Castro, he could have been overthrown overnight. Arm the Spanish people and you will see Franco overthrown in a few hours. Or give arms to the rest of Latin American peoples and you will see those tyrants overthrown alike.

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

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